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The Yale Law Journal
Volume 88, Number 3, January 1979

Presidential Power and
Administrative Rulemaking
Harold H. Brufff
The expanding scope of federal regulatory activities may require
the development of innovative management and review techniques.
In this decade alone, the government has undertaken major regulatory initiatives in such fields as environmental protection, occupational safety and health, and consumer product safety. These efforts
exemplify a tendency of modem regulation to delve increasingly into
highly complex and often controversial matters that affect broad segments of industry and the public.1 The increasing sprawl of the
federal agencies has challenged the effectiveness of the checks and
balances designed by the Constitution. Understandably, criticism of
the government's performance has not been lacking. Indeed, a general movement for "regulatory reform" has surfaced, advancing a
number of diverse and, in part, longstanding criticisms. 2 Both Congress and the federal courts have initiated measures to control the
regulatory bureaucracy.3
Several recent Presidents have taken tentative steps to join in this
enterprise,4 and in doing so, they have raised a question that is
t Professor of Law, Arizona State University. The development of this article was
supported by the Commission on Law and the Economy of the American Bar Association.
The positions taken here are the author's and are not necessarily those of the Commission
or the Association.
1. See Schultze, The Public Use of Private Interest, HARPER'S, May 1977, at 43-44.
2. See generally, e.g., DoMEsTIC COUNCIL REVIEW GROUP ON REGULATORY REFORM, THE
CHALLENGE OF REGULATORY REFORM, A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT (1977); SUBCO.Im. ON
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH
CONG., 2D SEss., FEDERAL REGULATION AND REGULATORY REFORM 8-11 (Subcomm. Print 1976).

3.

See pp. 456-59 infra (Congress) & pp. 459-61 infra (courts).

4.

See pp. 63-65 infra. Presidents are not always impressed with their power over the

bureaucracy. President Truman remarked that former General Eisenhower would encounter some surprises on assuming the Presidency: "He'll sit there ... and he'll say, 'Do
thisi Do that!' And nothing will happen. Poor Ike-it won't be a bit like the Army." S.
OPOTOWSKY, THE KENNEDY GOVERNMENT 27 (1961).
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the subject of this article: what is the appropriate role of the President in regulatory policy formation by the federal agencies? This
question presents a fundamental dilemma. The President needs enough
power to execute the laws effectively; yet he must not destroy the
essential balance of power among the branches of the government.
The Watergate scandals vividly demonstrated the opportunity for
abuse of presidential power. President Nixon's misuse of the Internal
Revenue Service for political ends is one example of the harm that
can result from a President's considerable practical leverage over the
agencies. 5 Congress reacted to the Nixon Presidency by imposing new
statutory curbs on presidential action." These recent restrictions, along
with traditional interbranch competition to control the agencies, suggest that Congress is unlikely to grant the President substantial new
statutory powers to manage regulation. Thus, a definition of the
chief executive's role in the regulatory process must draw upon the
balance of powers contained in the existing scheme of statutory and
constitutional authority.
Additional considerations in an analysis of presidential power are
the distinctive functions and practical competence of each of our interrelated governmental institutions. The roles of other institutions
that oversee the agencies must be considered in relation to the role
of the Presidency. Indeed, it is inappropriate and unjustifiable for
any branch to assert a power that is beyond its practical competence,
that excessively intrudes on a function reserved to another branch,
or that impairs the exercise of constitutional checks by the other
branches.
This article begins by identifying the need for presidential involvement in agency rulemaking and then examines the relative efficacy
of agency oversight functions fulfilled by the three constitutional
branches of government and by regulated industries and the public.
Employing the separation of powers doctrine as a framework for
legal analysis, the article identifies both the relatively clear and the
more ambiguous boundaries of permissible presidential action. This
framework permits a critical examination of the Supreme Court cases
that bear most directly on the President's power to supervise agency
action-those defining his power to remove agency members from
5. See Summary of Information: Hearings Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary
Pursuant to H.R. Res. 803, a Resolution Authorizing and Directing the Committee on
the Judiciary to Investigate Whether Sufficient Grounds Exist for the House of Representatives to Exercise its ConstitutionalPower to Impeach Richard M. Nixon, President of
the United States of America, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 141-43 (1974).
6. See Zeidenstein, The Reassertion of Congressional Power, New Curbs on the President, 93 POLITICAL ScI. Q. 393 (1978); p. 492 infra.

452

Presidential Power
office. The analysis concludes that the removal cases take an unduly
rigid approach to separation of powers issues. Because a rigid approach is unsuited to modem needs of government, the Court should
take a more flexible approach, for which there is warrant in recent
constitutional cases. Such an approach would involve evaluating a
series of factors, including the President's capacity to exercise a given
power effectively, the presence or absence of implied statutory authority, the procedural or substantive effects of the proposed action,
the nature of the regulatory program involved, and the availability
of procedural safeguards against secret ex parte contacts. A consideration of primary importance is whether the other branches can effectively exercise their checks in order to limit and guide presidential
involvement in rulemaking.
I.

The Need for Presidential Involvement in Rulemaking

The federal agencies increasingly use rulemaking rather than adjudication to set regulatory policy; procedural differences between
the two forms of agency action raise problems addressed by regulatory
reform efforts. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) imposes
distinct requirements for adjudication and rulemaking.7 Adjudication must be conducted through a .full trial-type hearing with a decision confined to the record. "Informal" rulemaking, in contrast, is
usually subject only to simple requirements that the agency publish
notice of a proposed rule, afford the public an opportunity to comment on it, and include a concise statement of basis and purpose
with the final rule.8
Agencies now tend to rely on rulemaking to set policy partly because Congress has created many new regulatory programs that are
better implemented by general directives than by case-by-case deter7. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1976).
The courts have tried to maintain a line between agency "proceedings for the purpose
of promulgating policy-type rules or standards, on the one hand, and proceedings designed
to adjudicate disputed facts in particular cases on the other." United States v. Florida E.
Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 244-45 (1973) (reviewing Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915), and Londoner v. City of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908)).
Yet much agency action falls within neither category; the APA does not provide special
procedures for such "informal" executive actions as consent settlements and contracts.
See Pedersen, Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38, 39-41 (1975).
8. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
"Rulemaking" here will refer to matters governed by these statutory procedures, unless
otherwise indicated. In contrast to the "informal" rulemaking procedures summarized in
text, statutes occasionally subject rulemaking to the adjudication procedures of the APA.
See id. § 553(c). Such "formal" rulemaking is beyond the scope of this discussion.
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minations. 9 In addition, the agencies hope to avoid the delays and
burdens of adjudication.' 0 But precisely because rulemaking provides
a policymaking method that bypasses the procedural restrictions imposed on adjudication, there is cause for concern over the adequacy
of public participation in and external review of rulemaking. Rulemaking, unlike adjudication, is not immune to outside intervention"'
and instead is open to the influence of persons outside the agencypossibly including the President. This discussion will focus on the
acute regulatory issues raised in rulemaking, and on the presidential
role suggested by the inadequate responses of the other branches to
those issues.
The Call for Regulatory Reform
Four major criticisms of federal regulatory practices invite presidential involvement. First, as a result of the widespread opinion that
appointed bureaucrats are not sufficiently responsive to the public's
will, there have been attempts to increase the political accountability
of the agencies. 1 2 Underlying these efforts is a growing recognition
that even highly technical regulatory decisions ultimately involve
political choices among competing economic and social goals.' 3 For
example, the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) limitations
on the acceptable lead content of gasoline embody a judgment on
the extent to which uncertain long-term risks to the public health
justify sacrificing the fuel economy provided by lead additives.' 4 Recognizing that judgments of this kind depend on values as well as
A.

9. For example, technical standards for public health and safety are often set by rulemaking. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2081 (1976) (Consumer Product Safety Commission).
10. Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judicial Review,
59 CORNELL L. REV. 375 (1974). Agencies have discretion to choose between rulemaking
and adjudication when both are authorized. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267
(1974).
11. The APA, 5 U.S.C. § 557(d) (1976), forbids ex parte interference in adjudication.
Before the adoption of this section, a due process ground for such a result was invoked
in Pillsbury Co. v. FTC, 354 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1966). There also have been White House
efforts to forbid staff interference with agency adjudication. See Memorandum for the
White House Staff, Subject: Contacts between the White House and the Independent
Regulatory Agencies, from Assistant to the President Peter M. Flanigan (May 21, 1969),
reprinted in ITT Continental Baking Co., 82 F.T.C. 1188, 1191 (1973).
12. See, e.g., Congressional Review of Administrative Rulemaking: Hearings on H.R.
3658 & H.R. 8231 Bejore the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
13. Bazelon, Coping with Technology Through the Legal Process, 62 CORNELL L. REV.
817, 819-20 (1977).
14. See generally Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d I (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941
(1976).
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technical expertise, Congress has taken steps to increase public participation in agency rulemaking,13 and to improve its own oversight
of the agencies, 16 sometimes going so far as to review individual regu17
lations for a possible legislative veto.
A second concern has been that the agencies have not been sufficiently careful to ensure that their rules are legally justifiable and
will work in practice. Here, too, Congress has imposed new constraints on the rulemaking process, such as requirements that agencies
assemble a record to support their rules and that they survive heightened judicial review.' 8 These first two concerns and the reforms they
have generated are difficult to reconcile-one is value-laden and political, the other is rational and legalistic. Although these purposes
can be accommodated, the tensions between them will suffuse the
discussion here.
Third, there is a perceived need for greater coordination of policy
among agencies. Overlapping or fragmented agency jurisdiction has
resulted in conflicting rules or the absence of any federal policy at
all on some important matters.' 9 For example, federal regulation of
transportation is entrusted to a Cabinet department and three independent agencies, none of which has the statutory authority to resolve conflicts or to take comprehensive responsibility. 20 Small wonder
that we have no national transportation policy. Congress can alleviate
such problems by statutory consolidation, but it cannot eliminate
them. Creating a new Department of Energy 2 ' to perform functions
previously exercised by many other agencies does not resolve the
15. See pp. 489-90 infra.
16.

See, e.g.,

2 SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 95TH CONG., 1ST SESS., STUDY

ON FEDERAL REGULATION

(Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter cited as

STUDY

ON

FEDERAL

REGULATION].

17. Although Congress can reverse a regulation through legislation, it can accomplish
the same purpose but avoid the burdens of legislation through the device of the legislative
veto. If Congress authorizes one of its houses to veto a regulation, the assent of the other
house and of the President (or the override of his veto) becomes unnecessary. See generally Bruff & Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation: A Study of
Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1369 (1977). Giving the President a more active role
in regulatory policymaking may simply be a way to reinstate the balance of powers that
has been disrupted by the invention of the legislative veto.
18. See pp. 489-90 infra.
19. See generally 5 STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, szUp ra note 16.
20. See Robinson, On Reorganizing the Independent Regulatory Agencies, 57 VA. L.
REV. 947, 978-92 (1971).
21. Department of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 565 (1977).
Consolidation has practical and political limits-although generally consolidating energy
matters under the aegis of a new department, this statute created a new independent
commission within the Department for some functions.
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problem of coordinating the Department's rules with those of the
22
EPA.
Finally, the regulatory reform movement has called for particular
substantive changes in regulation. These range from recurrent criticisms of particular agency rules, such as the Interstate Commerce
Commission's (ICC) "backhauling" rules that force some trucks to return empty from delivery trips,2 3 to broader demands for partial or
24
complete deregulation of entire industries, such as the airlines.
Oversight of Agency Regulation: Congress,
the Public, and the Courts
Efforts to reform regulation have relied on Congress, citizen action,
and the courts, but the efficacy of these efforts has been limited.
B.

1. Congress and the Public
Because the regulatory agencies were created through congressional
delegations of power, Congress has set up the machinery of oversight
committees to review the conduct of the agencies. For this purpose,
Congress employs "substantive" committees that focus on the statutes
within their subject matter jurisdiction and review agency conduct
to appraise the need for change. 25 When controversy arises over agency
policy, these committees hold oversight hearings; as a consequence,
an agency may have to justify its practices even if no new legislation
is seriously considered.
This concentration of the oversight function in congressional committees accounts for some deficiencies in its performance. First, the
complex and unwieldy committee structure itself seriously hampers
22. Although the EPA could be merged with the new Department, it is often thought
wise to retain a separate status for an agency having an advocacy role. 5 STUDY ON FEDERAL
REGULATION, supra note 16, at 10.
Congress could mandate coordination of regulatory actions conducted by different
agencies through statutory language creating particular programs, but the effectiveness of
this technique is limited. See id. at 321, 323, 326 (explaining coordination purpose in
Toxic Substances Act).
23. See generally Regulatory Problems of the Independent Owner-Operator in the
Nation's Trucking Industry (Part 1): Hearings Before the Subconun. on Activities of
Regulatory Agencies of the House Conin. on Small Business, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
24. See, e.g., Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504; MESSAGE FROM THr
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, AIRLINE DEREGULATION, H.R. Doc. No. 92, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1977).
25. For general discussion of congressional oversight practices, see H. LINDE & G. BUNN,
LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSES (1976); M. OGUL, CONGRESS OVERSEES THE BUREAUCRACY (1976). A different oversight function is performed by the House and Senate
appropriations committees. See p. 458 infra.
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congressional efforts to coordinate policy. 26 A single federal agency
may report to numerous committees and subcommittees, each having
a different policy bent. To the extent that effective oversight is performed by committees, review is conducted without the primary checks
on the fairness of legislative policy that are embodied in the constitutional structure of Congress-national representation in each house,
and the bicameral structure.2 7 As sub-units of Congress, committees
provide narrower political accountability than does either house of
Congress; indeed, a committee often reflects the views of a single
powerful chairman or member.2 8 Moreover, committees are sometimes dominated by members sympathetic to an agency or its regulated industry, a situation that further reduces the prospect that oversight will be conducted in the general public interest.2
Apart from structural problems with congressional oversight, there
is little in its traditional exercise to inspire confidence. Regulation
has not attracted sustained attention in Congress. 30 Oversight hearings
have occurred sporadically, although they have been more frequent
and regular in recent years. 3 1 Consequently, congressional oversight
has not stimulated the ongoing policy dialogue between legislature
and agency that would be necessary to give coherent direction to
agency policymaking. 32 Instead, oversight has often blocked agency
policy initiatives without providing. an alternative course of action. 3:
Stalemate follows.
Congressional oversight hearings do not, however, exhaust the techniques available to Congress. It has two other explicit constitutional
powers that can influence agency policymaking: budgetary appropriations, needing the approval of both houses, and the Senate's right of
26.

See

HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON COMMITTEES, REPORT ON COMMITTEE REFORM AMEND-

S2295 (daily
ed. Feb. 4, 1977) (Sen. Huddleston); Adams, Sunset: A Proposal for Accountable Government, 28 AD. L. REV. 511, 539 (1976); Ribicoff, Congressional Oversight and Regulatory
Reform, 28 AD. L. REV. 414, 420 (1976).
27. In The Federalist, James Madison explained the framers' attempt to mitigate the
effects of faction in the structure of Congress. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison); see
McGowan, Congress, Court, and Control of Delegated Power, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 1119,
MENTS OF 1974, H.R. REP. No. 916, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); 123 CONG. REc.

1155 (1977).
28. See Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 17, at 1418; Robinson, The Federal Communications Commission: An Essay on Regulatory Watchdogs, 64 VA. L. REv. 169, 179-80 (1978).
29. See Robinson, supra note 28, at 179-82. This resembles the problem of factions that
the framers sought to avoid. See p. 461 & note 52 infra.
30. See 2 STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, supra note 16, at 109. Nor does regulation
receive consistent presidential attention. See p. 469 infra.
31. 2 STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, supra note 16, at 80-81, 120-21.
32. Robinson, suPra note 28, at 179-82.
33. Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 17, at 1420-22.
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advice and consent to presidential appointments. 3 4 Neither power
has led to effective congressional review of regulatory policy. Yearly
budgetary hearings in both houses provide an opportunity for the
appropriations committees to review agency performance, and to affect future policy either by changing appropriation levels or by expressing pleasure or displeasure with past actions.35 The appropriations process tends, however, to consider justifications for incremental
budget requests rather than the wisdom of basic regulatory policy.
Also, appropriations deliberations tend to focus on a few relatively
expensive programs such as national defense, social security, and welfare. The other potential source of congressional influence has had
even less effect: the Senate's advice and consent function, which theoretically gives Congress a voice in selecting those who manage the
agencies, has usually been exercised in a perfunctory fashion.30
Congressional frustration with the deficiencies of oversight has manifested itself in repeated experiments with the legislative veto as an
effort to acquire subsequent control on delegated power. Serious constitutional and policy difficulties surround that device; 37 not the least
of these problems is the claim that the President is effectively denied
the opportunity to exercise his standard review of legislation.
Other recent congressional attempts to improve regulatory policymaking include statutes that require agencies to follow more elaborate rulemaking procedures than those prescribed in the APA.38 This
effort may increase the role of citizens in creating more comprehensive records and more responsive agency rules. It may guard against
the "capture" of regulatory policymaking by regulated industries,
which exert better organized and more sustained pressure on regulators than does the diffused general public. 30 But broadening interest
representation before the agencies and increasing the effectiveness of
public lobbyists cannot guarantee actual agency responsiveness to new34.
35.
See 2
36.
37.
38.
39.

U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 7, 8; id. art. II, § 2.
The appropriations committees sometimes condition the use of appropriated funds.
STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, supra note

16, at 18-43.

Robinson, supra note 28, at 183.
See generally Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 17.
See pp. 489-90 infra.
See Robinson, supra note 28, at 175, 188-90. The point is well summarized in R.
NOLL, REFORMING REGULATION 41 (1971):
Most regulatory issues are of deep interest to regulated industries, with a very substantial amount of income.. . riding on the decision. The stake of the general public
may in the aggregate be even higher, but it is diffused among a larger number of
unorganized individuals.... The motivation of a single firm to fight an unfavorable
regulatory decision is very high, while a regulatory decision unfavorable to the general public is unlikely to generate enough interest to cause a general public interest
to be raised.
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ly represented interests. 40 Moreover, these reforms complicate and delay administrative proceedings and create a risk of impairing agency
decisionmaking. 41 Even if these reforms achieve their purpose of making agencies more responsive to more interest groups, they will do
little to promote coordinated and coherent agency policymaking. To
some extent, the diversity of interests represented both before the
agencies and in Congress may prevent effective initiatives to coordinate policy by either ad hoc reform groups or Congress itself.
2.

The Federal Courts

Judicial review of agency action is limited. Because the legislature
delegates discretion to administrators, not to reviewing courts, the
courts are not supposed to supplant administrative discretion over
policy matters by substituting judicial judgment for that of an agency. 42 The courts respond only to a challenge to a particular agency
action; the judicial strategy is to determine whether the action was
selected by fair procedures within constitutional and statutory limits
and whether the action was substantively reasonable. 43 This judicial
approach is not designed to promote coordination of policy or to respond broadly to the calls for regulatory reform.
More extensive efforts to influence the process of regulatory policymaking have been undertaken by lower courts but rejected by the
Supreme Court.44 A number of lower federal court decisions imposed
procedural requirements on informal rulemaking beyond those required by the APA.45 Often these judicially imposed requirements
resembled those usually associated with adjudication, such as opportunity for cross-examination and maintenance of a complete record.
The courts took this initiative because they often found it difficult
to review challenged rules effectively, especially because the APA does
40. See Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REv.
1667, 1760-90 (1975).
41. Id. at 1789-90.
42. G. ROBINSON & E. GELLHORN, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROcEss 227-28 (1974). This
restrained view of judicial review is an ideal that is not always exhibited in practice, but
it does guide the courts. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
43. G. ROBINSON &-E. GELLHORN, supra note 42, at 33.
44. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
45. See, e.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 829 (1977); Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974). See generally Pedersen, supra note 7; Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. REv. 185 (1974).
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not provide for any formal record to accompany rulemaking. 40 The
courts lacked confidence in the seriousness with which agencies had
taken public comments and the thoroughness with which agencies
had considered the issues underlying promulgated rules. The resulting judicial application of a high gloss to the APA was brought to
an abrupt halt by the Supreme Court in Vermont Yankee Nuclear
47
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
In Vermont Yankee, the Court held that the lower federal courts
do not have the authority to order agencies to engage in rulemaking
procedures beyond those specified in the APA or another relevant
statute. 48 The Court emphasized that the APA's provisions embody
legislative compromise, and establish the maximum procedures that
Congress has chosen to apply generically. Beyond these general statutory dictates, Congress may impose additional procedures for a particular statutory program 49 and agencies may choose to employ more
elaborate procedures, but the courts may not impose them. The Court
was concerned that without this restriction on the judiciary, unwarranted judicial intrusion into agency decisionmaking could usurp the
political authority of the agencies to set policy. In addition, the
Court worried that enlarged judicial supervision of challenged agency
actions would unduly restrict all agency choice of rulemaking procedures; retroactive judicial imposition of special procedures in some
cases could force agencies to act defensively by adopting maximum
procedures in every case.50
Judicial review is confined within special limits by both statutory
and constitutional doctrines. 51 Had the Vermont Yankee Court considered presidential review of agency rulemaking, in contrast, it might
46. Nathanson, Probing the Mind of the Administrator: Hearing Variations and
Standards of Judicial Review under the Administrative Procedure Act and Other Federal

Statutes, 75 CoLum. L. REv. 721, 754-55 (1975).
47. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).

48.

The courts are to continue, however, to review agency rules for arbitrariness, see

5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976), and may remand for an agency's failure to explain rules
sufficiently, see 435 U.S. at 535 & n.14.
49. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 57a(b), (c) (Supp. V 1975) (stringent procedures for FTC
rulemaking).
50. 435 U.S. at 547-48.
51. See, e.g., B. SCHWARTz, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 204 (1976).
One effect of Vermont Yankee is a renewal of debate over the proper limitations on
judicial review of agency activity. Compare Stewart, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution
of Administrative Procedure, 91 HAMV. L. Rav. 1805, 1810 (1978) (courts should review
agency choices for analytic support; record requirement itself is more expansive than
APA requirements) with Byse, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative
Procedure: A Somewhat Different View, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1823, 1830, 1831-32 (1978)
(court's role does not include imposing requirements for more adequate record; requirement of record beyond APA standards is mistake).
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have articulated a relatively broad scope of executive supervision of
regulatory practices. Indeed, to the extent that Vermont Yankee
restricts the oversight function of the federal courts on the grounds
that they lack the authority to affect policy decisions, one of the political branches may appropriately assume the initiative, thereby reducing pressure on the courts to step beyond the limits of traditional
judicial review. Furthermore, differences in the institutional structure
of the different branches suggest a different role for each. The institutional structure of the courts works against effective supervision of
rulemaking because the courts must wait for a suit brought to challenge existing circumstances. The President, in contrast, may impose
prospective requirements on the agencies by executive order. By using
this option, which is not available to the federal courts, the President
may be able to perform some oversight functions forbidden to the
courts and ineffectively performed by Congress.
C.

Regulatory Oversight by the President

Although some of the calls for regulatory reform may be satisfied
by congressional action, public pressure, or judicial review, presidential initiatives could bolster other checks on the regulatory process
and perform a coordinating, supervisory function that is not currently
being discharged. Some characteristics of the President's position in
the country and in the government make him uniquely capable of
assuming a role that is distinct from other forms of oversight.
First, he has a national constituency not shared by any of the
particular congressmen and committees that perform congressional
oversight. The framers of the Constitution accorded the President
a power to veto legislation partly in order to negate the effects of
factions in Congress,52 yet that same problem can persist if a faction
controls a congressional oversight effort. The President's national constituency does not guarantee that he will be equally responsive to all
interest groups, but adding his political base to the existing influences on a particular issue can only enrich the political accountability of agency action in general. It must be recognized that presidential participation will not always negate factional influences and
may, at times, reinforce them. This fact suggests the need to qualify
52. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison); id. No. 73 (A. Hamilton). The point is
well summarized in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 123 (1926):
The President is a representative of the people just as the members of the Senate and
of the House are, and it may be, at some times, on some subjects, that the President
elected by all the people is rather more representative of them all than are the members of either body of the Legislature . ...
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presidential intervention, but it does not justify preventing it entirely.
A further benefit of a presidential directive influencing regulation
is that it prompts the consideration of policy issues by Congress as
a whole. Policy stalemates often beset committee-agency relationships.
If the President were to issue a directive to an agency, Congress as
a whole would have to pass legislation to reverse it-and Congress
must be prepared to override his veto in order to countermand, his
position. Shifting the burden in this way would reserve for Cbngress
the ultimate legislative power, but would reduce the likelihood that
no affirmative policy decision will be made.
Finally, the President has a unique responsibility to superintend
the execution of many statutes at once. As Chief Justice Vinson observed, "[u]nlike an administrative commission confined to the enforcement of the statute under which it was created, or the head of
a department when administering a particular statute, the President
is a constitutional officer charged with taking care that a 'mass of
legislation' be executed."' ' This argument that the President has
some implied statutory or constitutional authority to harmonize the
welter of statutes, or to act interstitially at times, has a functional
basis because legislation necessarily distributes power in a somewhat fragmentary fashion, and cannot resolve all the future problems of coordinating policy under separate statutes.54 The President
has a unique vantage point from which he can focus on a vital issue
that falls within the jurisdiction of a variety of executive and independent agencies, each having power to deal with only part of
the problem 5
The underlying legal authority for presidential involvement in
regulation may be found in Article II of the Constitution, which
charges the President to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." 56 Giving meaning to this clause is a task undertaken in the
53. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 702 (1952) (Vinson, C.J.,
dissenting).
54. These characteristics of statutes cannot be removed by extremely broad drafting if
the delegation doctrine retains any force. See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 51, §§ 11-19.
55. See pp. 455-56 supra.
56. U.S. CoNST., art. II. § 3. Article II states:
Section 1. The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States

of America....
Section 2. The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of
the United States .. . . [H]e may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal
Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any subject relating to the Duties
of their respective Offices ....
[H]e shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall
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following elaboration of a range of possible presidential initiatives
for improving federal regulation.
II.

Presidential Initiatives and the Separation of Powers

A.

Proceduraland Substantive Directives

Presidential supervision of agency rulemaking might take the form
of either procedural or substantive directives. An example of a procedural directive is President Carter's Executive Order No. 12,044,
optimistically titled "Improving Government Regulations.".' 7 The
Order imposes a number of procedural requirements on the rulemaking activities of federal agencies within the executive branch, but
does not apply to the independent regulatory agencies, which have
5 8 It
traditionally been largely exempt from presidential direction.
adds flesh to the APA's rather lean procedures for informal rulemaking. The Order attempts to ensure that the opportunity for
public participation in rulemaking will be meaningful by requiring
that participation occur at an early stage in the drafting process and
by setting a minimum duration for the comment period in some
cases. There are also provisions for more careful review of proposed
rules within the promulgating agency. Under some circumstances
the Order requires an analysis of the anticipated impact of a proappoint Ambassadors ....
and all other Officers of the United States whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law:
but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they
think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of
Departments....
Section 3. He shall from time to time give to the Congress information of the
State of the Union and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall
judge necessary and expedient .
; he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed ....
Section 4. The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States,
shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason,
Bribery, or other High Crimes and Misdemeanors.
Presidents have not used the appointment power of § 2 consistently to shape regulatory
policy. See Robinson, supra note 28, at 183-84, 187-88. Instead, appointments of persons
without visible qualifications frequently are used to cancel political debts and to avoid
the controversy that attends nomination of persons with defined views. Id. The presidential oversight functions discussed in this article seem more adaptable to resolving
particular policy issues than does the oblique control provided by the appointments
power.
The framers' reasons for including such minor powers as the power to require opinions
of department heads are not known. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 207 (1927)
(McReynolds, J., dissenting). These provisions were later characterized by Justice Jackson
as "trifling" specifics, "inherent in the Executive if anything is." Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 641 & n.9 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
57. 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661 (1978).
58. See pp. 498-99 infra.
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posed rule and consideration of alternative approaches. Agencies must
also engage in periodic reviews of their existing regulations to assess
the need for their change or elimination.
Another example of a procedural directive was President Ford's
inflation impact statement requirement, also imposed by executive
order, and designed to force executive branch agencies to take account of economic matters outside their narrow statutory spheres.59
Inflation impact statements prepared under this program were reviewed by the President's Council on Wage and Price Stability. 0° There
are signs that the program influenced some agency decisions, although
it is difficult to isolate the effects of other variables. 61 At the very
least, the Order stimulated improvements in the economic analysis
62
capabilities of some affected agencies.
Another form of procedural requirement can promote coordination among agencies and can also influence the substance of regulation. Imposition of interagency review and comment procedures
forces the subject agency to respond to the comments of other agencies in explaining its rules, even though the reviewing agencies are
not granted the power to mandate changes in the rules. An example
of this is "Quality of Life" review, instituted by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in 1971 to review environmental regulations. 6 3 The history of Quality of Life review reveals a tendency
for "procedural" techniques such as interagency review to pressure
the subject agency toward substantive change, or to provide an opportunity for those opposed to statutory programs to delay their implementation. 4 The EPA circulated proposed regulations to other
agencies for comment and responded to their criticisms. The Department of Commerce was a frequent and hostile participant, often reflecting industry opposition to proposed EPA rules. If EPA's resolution of the issues dissatisfied other agencies, they called for a meeting, presided over by OMB officials and sometimes involving White
59. Exec. Order
December 31, 1977,
60. The Council
first, but it noted

No. 11,821, SA C.F.R. § 203 (1974). This order was extended to
by Exec. Order No. 11,949, 3 C.F.R. § 161 (1976).
found the quality of inflation impact statements to be uneven at
improvement over time. COUNCIL ON WAGE AND PRICE STABILITY
QUARTERLY REPORT No. 7, at 48 (1976).
61. Note, The Inflation Impact Statement Program: An Assessment of the First Two
Years, 26 Am. U.L. REv. 1138, 1160-61 (1977).
62. Id. at 1161-62.
63. Although theoretically designed for wider application, in practice Quality of Life
review focused almost exclusively on EPA regulations. See note 64 infra (citing sources).
64. See generally J. QUARLES, CLEANING UP AMERICA: AN INSIDER'S VIEW OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 117-42 (1976); Office of Management and Budget Plays
Critical Part in Environmental Policymaking, Faces Little External Review, 7 ENVIR. REP.
(BNA) 693 (1976).
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House staff. Once the disputed issues were resolved by meetings, proposed regulations were published in the Federal Register. The procedure was repeated before the promulgation of final regulations.
Because agency comments were not made part of the public record
and often occurred before notice of proposed rulemaking, Quality
of Life review had low visibility. The procedure effected some substantive changes and improved the quality of supporting analysis produced by the agency to justify its proposals. Although it caused some
delay in the regulatory process, it did permit the EPA to maintain
its autonomy in resolving substantive issues that it considered important.65
Thus, procedural requirements can have important effects on the
substance of agency policy, but they are distinguishable from direct
invasions of an agency's authority to determine the substance of its
rules.0 6 A substantive presidential order would direct an agency to
adopt, alter, or rescind a particular rule. The substantive directive
could occur as an ad hoc response to a highly controversial rule, or
as part of a regular procedure for policy directives seeking the overall coordination of federal policy. To date, Presidents have engaged
only in sporadic, ad hoc intervention, GT but proposals for more thoroughgoing policy coordination surface periodically. 8
B. Issues Raised by Presidential Initiatives
Many of the avenues of presidential action that have been proposed and some that have been taken have encountered problems
concerning the legal and practical boundaries of presidential authority. For example, President Carter's Executive Order No. 12,044 cites
no specific authority as its basis, 69 and at best relies on authority
implied by similar statutory requirements, such as environmental
65. See Implementation of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 1, at 231-32 (1972) (EPA Administrator Ruckelshaus asserting agency
independence from OMB).
66. Compare pp. 489-95 infra with pp. 495-98 inlra.
67. For example, when President Ford learned that the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare had prohibited father-son or mother-daughter activities in public
schools, he ordered immediate suspension and reexamination of the rule. Washington Post,
July 8, 1976, § A, at 1, col. 5.
68. E.g., Cutler & Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process, 84 YALE L.J. 1395
(1975). See generally K. DAVIS, ADMSINIsTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES §§ 1.04-14,
(1976); K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE Lxw TREATISE § 1.04-4 (Supp. 1970).

1.09-1

69. The Order simply begins, "As Presidept of the United States of America, I direct
each Executive Agency to adopt procedures to improve existing and future regulations."
43 Fed. Reg. 12,661 (1978).
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impact statements." Can the President act without explicit authority?71 Another question concerning the scope of presidential authority was raised by the original draft of the Order which suggested
that it would apply to the independent regulatory agencies.7 2 The
final version precluded this possibility, but many of the general demands for regulatory reform would require supervision of these traditionally independent bodies. Does the traditional status of the, independent agencies preclude presidential intervention? 3
Further questions arise from the possible substantive effects of presidential directives. The indirect substantive effects of an ostensibly
procedural directive and the impact of an explicitly substantive directive may exceed the limits of executive authority in particular
areas. Moreover, substantive effects of presidential initiatives may be
unfair to interested parties by leaving them without timely notice
or an opportunity to respond to the presidential position. This danger
was manifested in an incident during the Nixon Administration:
In 1971 Henry Ford II made a personal visit to the White House
complaining that the cumulative effect of Federal regulations...
would soon double the cost of the Ford Pinto and would require
comparable increases on other models. Soon after the White House
took a direct interest in [the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's] passive restraint rulemaking. A series of high level
briefings and exchanges of views took place between NHTSA,
DOT, and White House officials. Then Secretary of Transportation John Volpe, a firm advocate of the passive restraint proposal,
was reported to have returned despondently from sessions with
White House officials who rejected his efforts to defend the proposal. Eventually, in a White House confidential memorandum to
DOT, Presidential aides John Ehrlichman and Peter Flanigan
ordered both a delay in passive restraints and 7 a4 requirement for
the ignition interlock. NHTSA duly complied.
70. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
71. See pp. 490-91 inIra.
72. The Order was published in the Federal Register in draft form for public comment, 42 Fed. Reg. 59,740 (1977). It was ambiguous and might have applied to the independent agencies; the President sought public comment about whether it should be
applied to them. As finally issued, the Order exempted them, with the explanation that
the President sought to avoid a "confrontation with Congress over the applicability of
the order to the independent iegulatory agencies." 43 Fed. Reg. 12,670 (1978). He accompanied the Order with a letter to the chairmen of the independent agencies, asking
them to apply the Order's procedures voluntarily. President's Letter to Heads of Independent Regulatory Agencies, 14 WEEKLY COMP. OF PREs. Doc. 563-64 (Mar. 27, 1978).
73. See H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 23-26 (1946); S. REr. No. 752, 79th
Cong., 1st Sess. 13-16 (1945).
74. 8UBCOIMs. ON OVERSIGHT AND INIEsIGATIONs, HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND
FOREIGN COMMERCE, FEDERAL REGULATION AND REGULATORY REFORM
Print 1976) (footnotes omitted).
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This episode demonstrates the potential for White House staff to
become deeply-and perhaps improperly-involved in the rulemaking
process. Formal presidential supervision of rulemaking would tend
to increase informal contacts between White House staff and the
agencies, especially regarding substantive directives.7 3 These contacts
might be secret, or at least undisclosed by the administrative record.
If the consequence were to deny interested persons fair treatment, to
deflect an agency from its statutory grounds for decision, or to impair
the ability of the courts to review rules, a violation of the governing
statutes could result. To avoid this danger, what procedural con76
straints should there be on presidential intervention?
C.

The Contours of Presidential Power: Competing
Theories of the Presidency

Questions regarding the scope of presidential power reveal the underlying problem: since the Presidency is not a clearly defined office, each occupant places his personal stamp on it and each historical
period leaves its mark. The conception of executive power bequeathed
7
by the framers of the Constitution is ambiguous. T
At a level of great generality, there is consensus that the framers'
purpose in drafting Article II was to strengthen the executive and
provide a more effective check on the legislature than the checks
that had been available under the Articles of Confederation.78 By
75. Cf. Bruff & Gellhorn, suPra note 17, at 1409-12 (legislative veto provisions tend to
cause increased informal contacts between congressional and agency staffs).
76. See pp. 500-06 infra.
77. As Justice Jackson lamented,
[a] judge, like an executive adviser, may be surprised at the poverty of really useful
and unambiguous authority applicable to concrete problems of executive power as
they actually present themselves. Just what our forefathers did envision, or would
have envisioned had they foreseen modem conditions, must be divined from materials
almost as enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was called upon to interpret for Pharaoh.
A century and a half of partisan debate and scholarly speculation yields no net result
but only supplies more or less apt quotations from respected sources on each side of
any question. They largely cancel each other. And court decisions are indecisive because of the judicial practice of dealing with the largest questions in the most narrow

way.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-35 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (citation omitted). Indeed, Justice Jackson can be charged with understating his
case: an additional source of confusion and indecisiveness are the broad dicta frequently
elaborated in Supreme Court decisions concerning the limits of presidential power. Such
overstatements may derive from the fact that presidential power has received its outlines
in a series of isolated "great cases." See, e.g., Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S.
602 (1935); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
78. See, e.g., R. BERGER, EXECUTIvE PRIVILEGE 49-59 (1974) (Article II established strong
executive with enumerated powers in order to protect against overpowerful legislature and
also executive tyranny); E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE AND POWERS 1781-1957, at 5-16
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1781, experience had demonstrated that the Articles of Confederation,
which provided for no national executive, were an overreaction to
the perceived executive tyranny against which the Revolution had
been fought. T9 The Constitution's framers therefore wanted to create
an effective national executive, but they did so in a climate of marked
apprehension about excessive executive power. No evidence remains
of the extent to which the framers thought it proper for the President
to supervise policy decisions of his subordinates. Even if such evidence
were available, it would have only limited persuasiveness in resolving
contemporary problems within an executive establishment with dimensions and activities that were not then foreseen. 0
Today, the President has to play many roles, including "Commander in Chief, primary proposer of legislation and chief lobbyist,
top executive in the executive branch, guardian of the economy, negotiator with other nations, head of state, party leader, and moral
leader." 8 ' Minimally, as chief political executive, the President is required "to annually make a relatively small number of highly significant decisions-among them, setting national priorities, which he
does through the budget and his legislative proposals, and devising
8 s2
policy to ensure the security of the country.

If the President is to perform these roles and carry through the
national priorities that he sets, he needs the power to influence the
direction of federal regulatory policies in some fashion. But the grave
contemporary concern is that the chief executive will seek and acquire
the power to turn the office into an "Imperial Presidency."8 13 For
domestic regulation, such a broad view would hold that the President
might issue agencies substantive or procedural orders of any kind not
explicitly forbidden by legislation. Recognition of such a "roving
(4th ed. 1957) (Article II created one of three reciprocally limiting government branches);
Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76 COLum. L. REv. 369 (1976) (there is need
for limited but strong executive power to control the excesses of other branches).
79. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (J. Madison) at 322 (Modern Library ed. 1941):
The founders of our republics ... seem never for a moment to have turned their
eyes from the danger to liberty from the overgrown and all-grasping prerogative of
an hereditary magistrate, supported and fortified by an hereditary branch of the
legislative authority. They seem never to have recollected the danger from legislative
usurpations, which, by assembling all power in the same hands, must lead to the
same tyranny as is threatened by executive usurpations.
80. See generally P. BRESr, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 145-71 (1975)
(discussing variety of uses for framers' intent in light of changing factual circumstances
and changing moral and political ideas).
81. S. HESS, ORGANIZING THE PRESIDENCY 3 (1976).
82. Id. at 11.
83. See A. SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1974) (describing and assailing expansive conception of Presidency).
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commission to inquire into evils and upon discovery correct them"8 4
might well unbalance the constitutional scheme. Statutes leave many
policy issues open, even when the common practice of broad delegation is not followed. It would shift too much power to the President if, with few limitations, he could issue orders to agencies that
Congress could countermand only with the majorities necessary both
to pass legislation and to override a subsequent presidential veto.s5
In any event, the broad view of power seems to overestimate the
institutional competence of the Presidency. It assumes that the President can realistically hope to serve as the overall coordinator of federal
regulatory policy. In the past, Presidents have not succeeded in coordinating policy even within the executive branch, where the power
to do so has often been assumed to exist.8 6 Nor is this situation likely
to change: not all issues in regulation are sufficiently important or
politically controversial to command presidential attention, and a
serious attempt to control the vast regulatory bureaucracy, even excluding the independent agencies, would be a staggering task. Moreover, there is ample reason to doubt that the formation of federal
policy would be improved by concentrating it in the White House,
thereby creating a potentially unmanageable task.8 7 Indeed, pluralism
serves a valuable role in government"S-the problem is one of accommodating it with a similarly real, but not limitless, need for coordination.
Therefore, it seems best to begin with a more limited view of the
Presidency, and to assess its implications for presidential oversight
of rulemaking. An influential vision of a relatively modest, "problematic" Presidency is that of Richard Neustadt who emphasizes the
President's interaction with a complex set of institutions and groups
having substantial power of their own.8 9 Hence his power, especially
84. The phrase is Justice Cardozo's, concurring in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935). The context was the invalidation of a very broad
statutory delegation of power to the President. Because Cardozo rejected broad presi-

dential power even when Congress tried to grant it, he would undoubtedly have disapproved of a President's attempt to assume it without special authority.
85.

Because a presidential directive may force Congress as a whole to respond to the

executive initiative, it may act as a beneficial counterweight to factions within Congress.
But such presidential power should also be limited.
86. Robinson, supra note 20, at 952-54.
87. See Bruff, PresidentialExemption from Mandatory Retirement of Members of the
Independent Regulatory Commissions, 1976 DUKE L.J. 249, 274-76.
88. This is particularly important in matters raising value choices rather than questions
of expertise. See pp. 454-55 supra.
89.

See R. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER (1960). The "imperial" and the "problematic"

Presidencies are two models that can be traced as alternating conceptions through the
history of the United States. See Manley, PresidentialPower and White House Lobbying,
93 POLITICAL SCI. Q. 255, 255-56 (1978).
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in domestic matters, is largely that of initiation, response, and persuasion.
He has, of course, the constitutional power to propose legislation, 0
and the statutory power to influence policy by reviewing budgetary
and legislative requests of the agencies. 9 1 But would the problematic
Presidency encompass the power not just to propose but also to dispose of a policy initiative with an executive order having the force
of law unless overridden by Congress? Even a restrained view of presidential power can provide a place for this kind of initiative.9 2 An
examination of the separation of powers doctrine reveals room for
a limited presidential role in supervising and coordinating regulation
that can increase the overall effectiveness of our system of agency
oversight without creating an "imperial" President.
The Contours of Presidential Power:
Separation of Powers Analysis
Starting with the steel seizure case, 93 modern interpretation of the
President's role has been guided by the separation of powers doctrine. As the contrasting opinions in that case reveal, however, the
doctrine has sometimes been construed to mean a simplistic and complete separation of governmental functions that precludes one branch
from performing tasks that resemble the duties of another branch.
Yet the doctrine has also been understood, in terms more faithful to
the intent of the Constitution's framers, to reflect a complicated theory
of shared but reciprocally limiting powers, distributed among the
D.

90. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
91. See p. 494 infra.
92. Although his book is an argument against overblown presidential powers, Joseph
Califano concludes with recommendations for new presidential powers to increase the
accountability of federal agencies. J. CALIFANO, A PRESIDENTIAL NATION 314 (1975). John
Gardner, chairman of the citizen political reform group called Common Cause, observed
in the wake of Watergate that the Presidency must be strengthened:
We have heard demands for a seemingly simple remedy: weaken the Presidency,
strengthen Congress. But ours is a huge and complex society in a swiftly changing
world: we can never again have a weak Presidency or Executive Branch. And Congress, in its nature, cannot play the leadership role alone.
Our only recourse is to accept the necessity for a strong Presidency and Executive
Branch and at the same time to create powerful instruments for calling them to account. Most of the needed instruments now exist but require strengthening. It is not
just a matter of holding government accountable. Government must help us to hold
accountable the great power centers of the private sector.
Gardner, Rebirth of a Nation (statement issued by Common Cause 1974), reprinted in
Cohen, Reflections on Political Reform, 67 CURRENT HIsT. 49, 51 (1974).
93. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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branches of government. 94 The framers were careful to divide and
disperse political power; to accomplish this goal fully, governmental
responsibilities had to be shared in order to check abuses that could
accompany the exercise of entirely independent power.95 Many subsequent observers have noted that the phrase "separation of powers"
is misleading, 96 yet it continues to stand for an enduring set of principles9 T that are invoked in significant judicial determinations of presidential power.
1. Two Views on Separation of Power:
The Steel Seizure Case
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer98 arose during the
Korean War when a strike was threatened in the steel industry. Without statutory authority, President Truman issued an executive order directing the Secretary of Commerce to seize and operate the
steel mills. In an opinion by Justice Black, the Supreme Court
affirmed the issuance of an injunction against the seizure. 9 9 The
Court emphasized that the President relied on neither express nor
implied statutory authority for the order; indeed, Congress had recently considered and rejected proposed seizure authority in its debates on the Taft-Hartley Act.10 0 The Court rejected the argument
that the President had "inherent power" to avert the threat to national security posed by a steel strike in wartime. The Court found
that neither the President's powers as Commander-in-Chief nor the
general constitutional grant of executive power was sufficient to justify the domestic seizure. 101
In his opinion, Justice Black relied chiefly on a theory of separation of powers that would prohibit the executive from undertaking
activity that could be viewed as lawmaking because that function
94. See Fleishman & Aufses, Law and Orders: The Problem of PresidentialLegislation,
LAv 9- CONTEMP. PROB., Summer 1976. at 1-5, 3 n.21 (quoting Madison and others to
identify founders' conception of powers shared by separate institutions).
95. Id. at 2.
96. Id. at 3 & nn.20-21 (citing commentators).
97. Corwin identified three basic principles embedded in the notion of separated
powers: "First, that the three functions should be reciprocally limiting; second, that each
department should be able to defend its characteristic functions from intrusion by either
of the other departments; and third, that none of the departments may abdicate its
powers to either of the others." Id. at 4 (summarizing E. CORIIN, supra note 78, at 9).
98. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
99. Id. at 589.
100. Id. at 586. President Truman sent, without success, two messages to Congress inviting ratification of his action. Id. at 583.
101. Id. at 587-88.
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is the province of Congress exclusively. 10 2 Justice Black concluded
that
[t]he President's order does not direct that a congressional
policy be executed in a manner prescribed by Congress-it directs
that a presidential policy be executed in a manner prescribed by
the President. . . . The Constitution does not subject this lawmaking power
of Congress to presidential or military supervision
10 3
or control.
Justice Black's separation of powers analysis was sufficient to dispose of the case at hand, but it was unduly simplistic. His broad
dictum that the President's lawmaking functions are confined to recommendations to Congress and vetoes is refuted by the reality of
executive power under most legislation. To the extent that Congress
legislates through general policy standards, it necessarily relies on
the executive discretion to define the law in greater particularity
through its application. 0 4 Statutes thus require the executive to "make
law" by executing it; rulemaking statutes routinely delegate lawmaking power to the executive branch. The Court itself has recognized the power of Congress to delegate broad lawmaking power to
the executive. 10 5 Perhaps Justice Black's analysis failed to take into
account the prevalence and legitimacy of executive lawmaking due
to the fact that the case arose in the opposite context of a specific
congressional denial of presidential power to act.
Justice Jackson's famous concurring opinion in the case acknowledged that in different circumstances, different kinds and amounts
of presidential power could be found. 0 6 Instead of assuming simplis102. The Court noted:
Nor can the seizure order be sustained because of the several constitutional provisions that grant executive power to the President. In the framework of our Constitution, the President's power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea
that he is to be a lawmaker. The Constitution limits his functions in the lawmaking
process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he
thinks bad. And the Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal about who shall make
laws which the President is to execute. The first section of the first article says that
"All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States ...
Id.
103. Id. at 588.
104. See, e.g., K. DAvis, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 1-26 (1969).
105. See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 51, § 11 ("The law on delegation has moved from
the theoretical prohibition against delegation of legislative power . . . to a rule against
unrestricted delegations.") Although the delegation doctrine now permits executive lawmaking, it continues to require that executive discretion be confined by formal standards,
in order to ensure that it is confined within the policy bounds set by Congress. Id. at 3435. This requirement attempts to preserve congressional supremacy in lawmaking.
106. 343 U.S. at 635-38.
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tic categories of distinct government functions, Justice Jackson's analysis began with the recognition that
[p]residential powers are not fixed, but fluctuate, depending upon
their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress. We may
well begin by a somewhat over-simplified grouping of practical
situations in which a President may doubt, or others may challenge, his powers, and by distinguishing roughly the legal consequences of this factor of relativity.
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum,
for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that
Congress can delegate.... If his act is held unconstitutional under
these circumstances, it usually means that the Federal Government as an undivided whole lacks power....
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his
own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which
he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its
distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential
responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely
to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the
expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest
ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional
powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the
matter. Courts can sustain exclusive Presidential control in such
a case only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject. Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive and
preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake
is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system. 0 7
Justice Jackson concluded that the case before him fell in the third
category because Congress had explicitly denied the President the
power asserted. This approach seems to provide the most logical explanation of the case and the application of the separation of powers
doctrine that is most faithful to the intent of the framers. Under
this approach, the case would have little precedential value for situations such as rulemaking, in which Congress has not clearly articu107. Id. (citations omitted).
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lated what it considers to be the appropriate presidential role. 08
Rulemaking appears to fall within the "twilight zone" of Justice Jackson's second category, because both the APA and its legislative history are silent regarding the President's supervisory role. 0 9 Presidential initiatives in this area would therefore have to be reviewed
on a case-by-case basis;"10 the acts of the President would also be
limited to the policy alternatives authorized by Congress.
Given the general parameters of the President's authority set by
Youngstown, the President may be able to act without specific authority in overseeing the execution of many statutes at once." Although this argument was rejected in Youngstown, its assertion by
the dissenters was out of place because Congress had explicitly denied
the President authority to seize property. However proper it was
for the majority to reject the argument in that context, the case does
not foreclose the possibility that presidential power to coordinate
statutes without having explicit authority to do so may be legitimate
elsewhere-perhaps in a particular rulemaking situation.",'
108. Further, a presidential role in rulemaking presents a situation so different from
the one in Youngstown that many of the arguments raised in that case have no bearing.
For example, the majority and three dissenters debated whether the steel strike actually
created an emergency of such dimension that inherent presidential powers to protect the
nation could be asserted. Id. at 587; id. at 668 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting). The dissenters
readily amassed a series of cases in which presidential action without prior congressional
authorization had been upheld. Most of these involved real or purported emergenciesthe most vivid example is President Lincoln's extraordinary series of unauthorized actions
at the outset of the Civil War. See, e.g., The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863)
(confirming President Lincoln's authority to issue Emancipation Proclamation without
statutory authority). The emergency cases are appropriate for discussing inherent presidential powers, but they are relevant to presidential involvement in federal agency
rulemaking only in special cases. See pp. 495-96 infra.
Also providing little insight into the President's role in federal agency policymaking is
the discussion in Youngstown of cases involving foreign affairs and featuring broad
dicta about congressional delegations of presidential power. See 343 U.S. at 635 n.2 (Jackson, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304
(1936), as example of broad presidential authority available in foreign affairs). For a discussion of the President's powers regarding rulemaking involving foreign affairs matters,
see p. 495 infra.
Similarly, little can be learned about the President's role in agency rulemaking from
cases involving longstanding presidential practices never clearly authorized by Congress
but arguably ratified by its silence. See, e.g., 343 U.S. at 610-11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915), as example of congressional acquiescence over time to executive practice of withdrawing public lands from
private acquisition).
109. See H.R. REP. No. 1980, suPra note 73, at 23-26; S. REP. No. 752, supra note 73, at
13-16. See G. ROBINSON & E. GELLHORN, supra note 42, at 96-99. There were proposals for
an Office of Federal Administrative Procedure with a director to be appointed by the
President, Hearings on the Administrative Procedure Act Before the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1945), but they were not enacted. The office was
to study administrative procedure and recommend improvements.
110. See p. 479 infra.
111. 343 U.S. at 701-02 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting); see p. 495 infra (quoting dissent).
112. See p. 489 infra.
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Presidential power to influence or direct the procedure or substance of policy formed in rulemaking can be reconciled with Youngstown as long as the outcome is within the relevant statutory delegation of rulemaking power. Hence, presidential action may be justifiable if it comports with demonstrable needs to execute the laws
and if it does not offend policies found in the statutes governing
rulemaking. Such a reading of the case would respect the Court's
emphasis on maintaining the separations between the branches and
on preserving the ultimate supremacy of Congress in lawmaking, yet
it would incorporate the everyday reality of executive discretion to
form policy within the often commodious bounds of statutory commands. This view would also allow presidential initiatives in situations in which Congress has not explicitly attempted to limit the
113
President.
2.

The Removal Cases

Judicial analysis of the President's power to control the executive
branch and the independent agencies has also relied on the separation
of powers doctrine; here the simplistic view of that doctrine has
prevailed. 14 Thus, the Supreme Court cases involving the President's
power to remove members of agencies from office have drawn a rigid
11
line between the executive branch and the independent agencies. 5
As a result, the President is accorded nearly complete control over the
executive branch but no power over the independent agencies except for the constitutional power of appointment. This provides an
inadequate approach to the removal cases themselves and also neglects the meaning of separation of powers that was intended by
the framers.
The Supreme Court's first comprehensive exploration of the re0
moval power occurred in 1926, in Myers v. United States." Frank
113. Despite the plausibility of this view of Youngstown, the Court's emphasis that
Congress is the primary policymaker in domestic matters suggests that the Court may be
unreceptive to broad claims of inherent presidential power even when Congress has not
precluded them. See L. TRIBE, ANIERIcAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4-7 (1978); Kauper, Te
Steel Seizure Case: Congress, the President and the Supreme Court, 51 MICH. L. REv. 141,
174-75 (1952).
114. See pp. 470-71 sukra.
115. Although the cases bearing most directly on the President's power to control the
executive branch and the independent agencies are the removal cases, there are substantial differences between the power to remove an officer and the power to direct his
activities. Removal may raise some issues that directives do not; for example, the propriety
of patronage removals is unrelated to the disputes over agency policy or governance that
may arise from presidential involvement in agency rulemaking.
116. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
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Myers was a postmaster in Portland, Oregon, who had been appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate under a statute
giving him a four-year term, subject to removal by the President
with the Senate's advice and consent. For unstated reasons, President
Wilson dismissed Myers and did not ask for the Senate's approval.
In a suit for Myers's salary, the Court held that the statutory restriction of the President's power of removal was unconstitutional.
17
First, the Court noted that except for the impeachment clause,
the Constitution is silent on the subject of removals, and the subject was not discussed in the Constitutional Convention. 118 Despite
the express constitutional power of the Senate to consent to appointments and despite the power of Congress to define the qualifications
for and terms of executive offices, 119 the Court announced an implied presidential power of removal not subject to legislative limitation. Chief Justice Taft, himself a former President, deduced from
the President's duty to execute the laws a functional necessity for
him to direct the actions of executive officers 120 within the limits
set by authorizing statutes. 2 1 To ensure a unitary and uniform execution of the laws, the President must have the sanction of removal
to enforce his supervision of even the most lowly executive official. 22
117. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 4, quoted in note 56 supra.
118.
119.

See 272 U.S. at 110.
U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 ("Congress shall have power to make all laws which

shall be necessary and proper to carry into execution . . . all . . . powers vested by the

Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof.")
120. The vesting of the executive power in the President was essentially a grant of
the power to execute the laws. But the President alone and unaided could not execute
the laws. He must execute them by the assistance of subordinates. . . . As he is
charged specifically to take care that they be faithfully executed, the reasonable
implication, even in the absence of express words, was that as part of his executive
power he should select those who were to act for him under his direction in the
execution of the laws. The further implication must be, . . . that as his selection of
administrative officers is essential to the execution of the laws by him, so must be his
power of removing those for whom he can not continue to be responsible.
272 U.S. at 117 (citation omitted).
121. Id. at 132. Taft thus anticipated the holding of Youngstown.
122. Id. at 135. The Chief Justice did add a caveat:
Of course there may be duties so peculiarly and specifically committed to the discretion of a particular officer as to raise a question whether the President may overrule
or revise the officer's interpretation of his statutory duty in a particular instance.
Then there may be duties of a quasi-judicial character imposed on executive officers
and members of executive tribunals whose decisions after hearing affect interests of
individuals, the discharge of which the President can not in a particular case properly
influence or control. But even in such a case he may consider the decision after its
rendition as a reason for removing the officer, on the ground that the discretion
regularly entrusted to that officer by statute has not been on the whole intelligently
or wisely exercised. Otherwise he does not discharge his own constitutional duty of
seeing that the laws be faithfully executed.
Id.
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To reach its conclusion, the Court adopted a simplistic view of
the separation of powers. It argued that the Constitution meant to
forbid each branch from exercising a function of the others unless
there was an explicit provision blending them, as in the grant of
power to the Senate to consent to appointments. 12 3 Because removal
of executive officers was an executive function, Congress could not
participate in it without express sanction to do so.' 2 4 Therefore,
although Congress had explicit power to vest appointments in the
heads of departments, it could not impair the President's power to
remove officers.1 25 The difficulty with this approach is its tendency
to seize upon one explicit constitutional provision and to imply extensive powers from it, without regard to the limitations implied
126
by other constitutional provisions.
The breadth of the majority's position rendered it vulnerable to
persuasive arguments by the dissenters. Justices McReynolds and
27
Brandeis reviewed the framers' cautious view of executive power
and previous congressional restrictions on removal that had received
28
tacit approval from both the Supreme Court and the President.2
123. Id. at 116-18.
124. The Court's opinion did not carefully distinguish between congressional power to
restrict the grounds for removal and power to review a particular removal by requiring
the Senate's advice and consent. E.g., id. at 127. The dissenters suggested that the former
power is a legislative one, perhaps within the congressional power to prescribe qualifications; the latter might stand on different ground. Id. at 183 (McReynolds, J., dissenting);
id. at 245 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The Court apparently meant to forbid both.
125. Id. at 125-27, 163-64.
126. Broad implied powers are associated with the "Imperial Presidency." See p. 468
sutra.
127. As Justice McReynolds put it:
It is beyond the ordinary imagination to picture forty or fifty capable men, presided over by George Washington, vainly discussing, in the heat of a Philadelphia
summer, whether express authority to require opinions in writing should be delegated to a President in whom they had already vested the illimitable executive power
here claimed.
272 U.S. at 207.
In particular, the dissenters could find support in The Federalist:
It has been mentioned as one of the advantages to be expected from the cooperation
of the Senate, in the business of appointments, that it would contribute to the
stability of the administration. The consent of that body would be necessary to displace as well as to appoint. A change of the Chief Magistrate, therefore, would not
occasion so violent or so general a revolution in the officers of the government as
might be expected, if he were the sole disposer of offices.
THE FEDERALIST No. 77 (A. Hamilton) at 496 (Modern Library ed. 1941), quoted in 272
U.S. at 208 (McReynolds, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
128. The most disputed instance of congressional construction of Article II involved
the "decision of 1789," in which the first Congress had recognized presidential power to
remove the head of a new Department of Foreign Affairs. 272 U.S. at 111-26. Taft read
this as conceding the absence of congressional power to restrict removal; the dissenters
correctly rejoined that the decision was also consistent with a congressional view that
restricting the President in this instance was unwise but not unconstitutional. Id. at 194-
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The dissenters also urged against an unrestricted presidential removal
power, because the result could be a presidential spoils system intruding on the civil service laws. 12. 9 Further, the dissenters objected
to the pretense that all executive officers are alike and should be
subject to the same kind of presidential supervision. An unlimited
presidential removal power might be appropriate for cabinet officers
in whom the President requires personal confidence. 130 But for officers performing adjudications, such as judges without life tenure
and members of the ICC and Federal Trade Commission (FTC), a
31
plenary presidential removal power seemed clearly inappropriate.
In Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 32 the Court reviewed
President Franklin Roosevelt's removal of an FTC Commissioner
without asserted cause, 133 and held that a statute allowing removal
34
only for "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office"'1
was constitutional. Indeed, the Court thought that Congress had intended to insulate the FTC almost entirely from presidential in98 (McReynolds, J., dissenting); id. at 284-85 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). In support of their
view, the dissenters cited Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 162, 164-65 (1803),
which had reached its great constitutional issue only after determining that the statute
creating a term of office for the justices of the peace involved protected them from summary presidential removal. 272 U.S. at 215 (McReynolds, J., dissenting); id. at 242-43
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). Moreover, Presidents had repeatedly signed legislation including
removal restrictions. Id. at 209-15 (McReynolds, J., dissenting); id. at 250-83 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
129. The case at bar supported their argument well: postmasters constituted the
numerical bulk of all presidential appointees. The statutory provision in question, requiring the Senate's advice and consent to the removal of postmasters, was adopted as a
control on the presidential patronage power. 272 U.S. at 275-78 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
130. The Court itself observed that
[t]he degree of guidance in the discharge of their duties that the President may
exercise over executive officers varies with the character of their services as prescribed
in the law under which they act. The highest and most important duties which his
subordinates perform are those in which they act for him. In such cases they are
exercising not their own but his discretion. This field is a very large one. It is sometimes described as political.
Id. at 132.
131. Id. at 181-82 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
132. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
133. Commissioner William Humphrey was nominated to the Commission by President
Hoover. President Roosevelt requested Humphrey's resignation, "on the ground 'that the
aims and purposes of the Administration with respect to the work of the Commission can
be carried out most effectively with personnel of my own selection,' but disclaiming any
reflection upon the commissioner personally or upon his services." Id. at 618. Roosevelt
removed Humphrey after the commissioner refused to resign.
134. 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1976) (causes required for removal). Statutory definitions of cause
for removal often closely resemble this provision. E.g., 49 U.S.C. § 11 (1970) (ICC:
identical); id. § 1321(a)(2) (1970) (CAB: identical); see 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1970) (NLRB:
"upon notice and hearing, for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office, but for no other
cause"); 42 U.S.C.A. § 7171(b) (West Supp. 1977) (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in Department of Energy: "only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance
in office").
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terference, and that it could do so. 135 In order to distinguish the
sharply contrary opinion in Myers, which had granted the President
unlimited authority to remove executive officers, the Court in Humphrey's Executor concluded that the FTC commissioner was not a
member of the executive branch.13 6 In an attempt to limit the excesses of Myers, the Court's equally sweeping opinion in Humphrey's
Executor thus eliminated presidential removal power from the "head37
less 'fourth branch' " of the independent agencies.
The Court assumed that its alternatives were to find a presidential
removal power limited only by Article III's explicit tenure protection for members of the judiciary, or to recognize congressional authority to divorce such agencies as the FTC from executive control.
Yet these were not the only alternatives; the framers' conception of
shared but mutually limiting powers 38 and Justice Jackson's approach to the accommodation among the branches 1 39 point toward
a more flexible, case-by-case balancing of the need for presidential
action against the need for checks against unlimited executive power.' 40 Instead, Humphrey's Executor established an unrealistic and
135. The Court thought that the ultimate goal of Congress was to divorce the FTC
from politics entirely:
The commission is to be non-partisan; and it must, from the very nature of its
duties, act with entire impartiality. It is charged with the enforcement of no policy
except the policy of the law. Its duties are. neither political nor executive, but predominantly quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative. Like the Interstate Commerce Commission, its members are called upon to exercise the trained judgment of a body of
experts "appointed by law and informed by experience."
295 U.S. at 624 (quoting Illinois Cent. Ry. v. ICC, 206 U.S. 441 (1906)).
Thus, ...
the Congressional intent to create a body of experts who shall gain
experience by length of service-a body which shall be independent of executive
authority except in its selection, and free to exercise its judgment without the leave
or hindrance of any other official or any department of the government. To the
accomplishment of these purposes, it is clear that Congress was of opinion that length
and certainty of tenure would vitally contribute. And to hold that, nevertheless, the
members of the commission continue in office at the mere will of the President, might
be to thwart, in large measure, the very ends which Congress sought to realize by
definitely fixing the term of office.
Id. at 625-26 (emphasis in original).
The long, staggered terms of commissioners and the statutory provision limiting removal
to cause suggested this congressional purpose to the Court.
136. Thus, the postmaster in Myers was distinguished from the commissioner on the
ground that the postmaster was charged only with executive functions and had no duty
related to the legislative power. Id. at 624-26.
137. The phrase, quoted in K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LvW TREATISE, supra note 68,
§ 1:7, at 21-22, originated with the President's Committee on Administrative Management that reported to President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1937.
138. See p. 471 supra.
139. See p. 473 supra.
140. Despite its holding, the Court in Myers suggested a flexible approach by remarking that presidential supervisory power might vary with the function involved. Greater
indepeen(lnce might be reserved for officials entrusted with "quasi-judicial" decisions
and matters of individual discretion, see note 122 supra. Cabinet-level officers could be
treated as fully subordinate to the President, see note 130 supra.
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oversimplified distinction between "purely executive" officers, to
whom Myers still applied, and others, for whom Congress could limit
the presidential removal power. 4 1 This distinction is belied by practice: the executive agencies often perform "quasi-legislative" and
"quasi-judicial" functions;'- ' independent commissions often perform
4
such executive duties as prosecution.1 3
The Court's doctrinal difficulties probably stemmed from its -uncritical acceptance of the premise traditionally underlying the formation of independent agencies-that regulation should be entrusted
to nonpartisan experts whose decisions are free from "political" supervision by the President.14 4 Yet the independent agencies have never
141. The first unrealistic and oversimplified application of the distinction appeared
in Humphrey's Executor itself, when the Court inadvertently defined the FTC in terms
characteristic of an executive agency-"an administrative body created by Congress to
carry into effect legislative policies"-but concluded that the agency "cannot in any
proper sense be characterized as an arm or an eye of the executive." 295 U.S. at, 628.
Difficulties in applying the Court's distinction are manifested in subsequent cases. See
Morgan v. TVA, 115 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 701 (1941) (upholding
removal of TVA director, although admitting that TVA exercised only "predominantly"
executive function); Lewis v. Carter, 436 F. Supp. 958 (D.D.C. 1977) (denying preliminary
injunction to reinstate member of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission because
EEOC quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions are insufficient to qualify it as independent agency); Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104 (D.D.C. 1973) (President's removal of
Watergate Special Prosecutor Cox held illegal).
Moreover, actual emphasis on certain functions of an office may vary with time: for
example, the FTC has recently become active in rulemaking; in earlier times it relied
heavily on informal ("executive"?) enforcement practices and adjudication. See generally
G. ROBINSON & E. GELLHORN, supra note 42, at 411, 529-31.
One simple, predictable definition of the Court's term "purely executive officers" would
include only Cabinet-level officers, except that Humphrey explicitly endorsed the holding
of Myers, which concerned postmasters. See 295 U.S. at 624-26.
142. See note 135 supra (quoting Humphrey's Executor).
For example, the Food and Drug Administration issues many rules, and the Social
Security Administration performs vast numbers of adjudications. Both are within the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.
As Justice Jackson explained, dissenting in FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487-88
(1952), use of the terms "quasi-legislative" and "quasi-judicial" does not aid analysis:
Administrative agencies have been called quasi-legislative, quasi-executive or quasijudicial, as the occasion required, in order to validate their functions within the
separation-of-powers scheme of the Constitution. The mere retreat to the qualifying
"quasi" is implicit with confession that all recognized classifications have broken
down and "quasi" is a smooth cover which we draw over our confusion as we might
use a counterpane to conceal a disordered bed.
143. The FTC's shared jurisdiction with the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice in antitrust enforcement is perhaps the best example of this. Both agencies
exercise prosecutorial discretion, a classic executive function. See 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1976)
(FTC enforcement authorization); id. §§ 1312, 1314 (Justice Department enforcement).
144. See note 135 supra. For discussion of this theory, see 5 STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, supra note 16, at 26-32; IFreedman, Crisis and Legitimacy in the Administrative
Process, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1041, 1056-61 (1975). In general, independent agencies hase been
created to regulate difficult, technical subjects such as utilities and nuclear power plants.
An independent agency has also been selected when regulation takes the form of ad-
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been totally isolated either from the President 145 or from politics.14
In recent years, it has become evident that the traditional premise
is itself unsound to the extent that value judgments underlie even
technical regulation. 147 Congress has implicitly recognized this fact
in its recent attempts to increase the political accountability of regulation. 148 Thus, whatever its original basis, the device of independent
regulation seems to have evolved into a means for adjusting the
balance of power over the agencies between Congress and the President. 49 So viewed, it does not merit the broad constitutional protection that the Court gave it.
There is another possible basis for the Court's holding in Humphrey's Executor, one less laden with overbroad implications. The case
seems to rest in large part upon a procedural value-the necessity of
recognizing congressional power to protect officers engaged in adjudication from summary removal without cause. 110 This is a clearly
appropriate ground for recognizing congressional power to restrict
judication, as with licensing of broadcast stations. In some instances, these characteristics

combine; the presence of either has influenced Congress to remove decisionmaking from
executive control.
145. The President commands certain statutory powers over them in addition to his
appointments power. See pp. 491-95 infra. The very provisions that restrict the President's power to remove members of the independent agencies presuppose some presidential
supervisory power, which is as yet undefined.
146. Congressional oversight is certainly political. Moreover, broad statutory delegations of power to agencies transfer much of the political process from the halls of Congress to those of the agencies. Gellhorn & Robinson, Perspectives on Administrative Law,
75 COLUM. L. Rav. 771, 775-79 (1975).
147. See pp. 454-55 supra; Cutler & Johnson, supra note 68 at 1405-06; Freedman,
supra note 144, at 1063; Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 146, at 778-79 & 778 n.22; Noll,
Breaking Out of the Regulatory Dilemma-Alternatives to the Sterile Choice, 51 IND. L.J.
686, 688 (1976).
148. See pp. 489-90 infra.

Nor has Congress been entirely consistent in its delegation practices. Recent statutes
have often placed "expert" determinations of the sort traditionally thought suitable for
the independent commissions in executive branch agencies such as the EPA. In contrast,
the independent agencies perform much rulemaking that is not technical, for example
the FTC's consumer protection activities. See 15 U.S.C. § 57a (1976).
149.

See Karl, Executive Reorganization and PresidentialPower, 1977 Sup. CT. REV. 1.

150. If Congress is without authority to prescribe causes for removal of members of
the trade commission and limit executive power of removal accordingly, that power
at once becomes practically all-inclusive in respect of civil officers with the exception
of the judiciary provided for by the Constitution. The Solicitor General . . . agreed

that his view in respect of the removability of members of the Federal Trade Commission necessitated a like view in respect of the Interstate Commerce Commission
and the Court of Claims. We are thus confronted with the serious question whether
not only the members of these quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial bodies, but the
judges of the legislative Court of Claims exercising judicial power . . . continue in
office only at the pleasure of the President.
295 U.S. at 629.
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removals. 5 1 For example, no one would argue that the statutory
tenure protections now enjoyed by administrative law judges'5 2 should
be found unconstitutional. Hence the Court may have been avoiding
a constitutional issue other than the one explicitly before it.
Some support for this view of Humphrey can be drawn from the
Court's similar reasoning in another case decided the same day. In
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,1 3 the Court invalidated the National Industrial Recovery Act as an unconstitutionally
broad delegation of legislative power. In distinguishing earlier statutory delegations that had been upheld, the Court emphasized that
they provided for fair adjudicative procedures to confine administrative discretion. 1 54 This due process value underlying Schechter Poultry
justifies the holding in Humphrey's Executor that Congress has some
authority to restrict the President's removal power; it does not, however, require broad dicta that regulatory agencies such as the FTC
must be completely independent of executive supervision.
The due process value reappeared in Wiener v. United States,' 55
the Supreme Court's most recent treatment of the removal issue.
Congress established the War Claims Commission to "adjudicate according to law" certain claims arising from enemy action in World
War II. The commissioners were presidential appointees; there was
no provision regarding their removal.151 President Eisenhower, asserting a need to complete the Commission's task "with personnel of
my own selection," removed Commissioner Myron Wiener, who then
sued for lost salary. Justice Frankfurter's opinion for a unanimous
T
Court reiterated the simplistic categories of Humphrey's Executor'
and found that Congress intended the Commission to be protected
from presidential review because it was an adjudicating body charged
with deciding claims on the merits, entirely free of influence from
any other branch of government.'5 8 Wiener's removal was illegal because Congress would not want the commissioners to fear "the Damocles' sword of removal by the President for no reason other than
151. It has not, however, been accorded constitutional status. See, e.g., Marcello v.
Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 311 (1955) (summary rejection of claim that adjudications performed
by officers subject to general supervisory control offend due process).
152. 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (1976); see Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference, 345

U.S. 128 (1953).
153. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
154. Id. at 538-41.
155. 357 U.S. 349 (1958).
156. The Commission was to complete its task within three years, thus setting a fixed
term for the Commissioners. Id. at 350.
157. Id. at 353.
158. Id. at 355-56.
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that he preferred to have . . . men of his own choosing."15 9 This

holding is sound because an adjudicating agency does deserve protection from outside interference. The unfortunate feature of the
decision was its uncritical repetition of the broad distinction in Humphrey's Executor between executive and independent officials.
The Supreme Court's removal cases leave us without sound guidelines for the extent of presidential power to govern rulemaking. The
facts of the cases, involving three clumsy removals without asserted
cause and with overtones of patronage, did not force the Court to
focus on problems of general policy formation and coordination in
government or on the need for presidential review of a specific policy
issue. Thus, the holdings in Humphrey's Executor and Wiener do
not establish the appropriate grounds for presidential removal of independent commissioners beyond the bare conclusion that the statutes
do not permit removal at the pleasure of the President.
If the dicta of the removal cases are taken at face value, the net
result of the Court's rigid approach is unrestricted presidential
domination over executive officers, and complete protection from his
influence for independent officers. Not only does this result deviate
from the system of checks and balances envisaged by the framers,
it also has been challenged by other more recent cases applying a
flexible approach to separation of powers issues, and by recent statutory grants of presidential powers.
3.

The Recent Supreme Court Approach

Recent Supreme Court decisions taking a flexible approach to
separation of powers issues warrant a departure from the simplistic
analysis in the removal cases. In United States v. Nixon,'6° the Supreme Court was willing to imply a presidential power for functional
reasons, but was unwilling to extend that power beyond its justification in a particular case. The Court recognized a limited, constitutionally based privilege of confidentiality for records of conversations
between the President and his staff. Although the Constitution mentioned no such privilege, the Court inferred it from the President's
functional need to ensure candid communications in the process of
executive decisionmaking. 16 1
159. Id. at 356.
160. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
is there any
161. Id. at 705-06; see id. at 711 ("Nowhere in the Constitution, ...
explicit reference to a privilege of confidentiality, yet to the extent this interest relates to
the effective discharge of a President's powers, it is constitutionally based.")
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The Court's approach was marked by caution. 16 2 It was willing
to recognize only a qualified executive privilege that did not prevail
in the case at hand; the purposes behind a specific subpoena for evidence relevant to a criminal prosecution outweighed the President's
"undifferentiated" interest in confidentiality. If the competing interest had been less important or if the President's interest in confidentiality had been focused, for example, on the need to protect
particular military secrets, the Court might have decided the case
differently. 163 The balancing approach employed by the Court suggests that constitutional arguments for implied presidential power
in the rulemaking context may be successful if they persuasively
establish a particular functional necessity that would outweigh competing interests.
In Buckley v. Valeo,164 the Court again adopted a relatively discriminating approach to separation of powers issues in its invalidation
under the appointments clause of statutory requirements that some
members of the Federal Election Commission be congressional rather
than presidential appointees. The Court emphasized that the branches
of government were meant to be "largely" but not totally separate
from one another. 65
162. Although the opinion and the holding of the case are cautious, in one statement
the Court suggested that other implied powers or privileges might "flow from the nature
of enumerated powers." Id. at 705-06. The Court appended a footnote suggesting a very
broad approach that is inconsistent with the rest of the opinion and that appears to
equate the determination of implied presidential power with the very different question
of congressional power under the "necessary and proper" clause. Id. at 705 n.16. For a
discussion of the difficulties raised by so broad an approach to presidential power, see
Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in Determining Incidental Powers of the President
and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal Effect of "The Sweeping
Clause," 36 OHIO ST. L.J. 788, 809-17 (1975).
163. It has been suggested that in reaching the merits, Nixon may have implicitly
overruled the remainder of Myers, so that there are no longer any limits on congressional
power to restrict presidential removals. Mishkin, Great Cases and Soft Law: A Comment
on United States v. Nixon, 22 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 76, 82-83 (1974) (observing that court
rejected claim that case was nonjusticiable as interbranch dispute between Special
Prosecutor and President). The case is more properly understood as a waiver of the
President's plenary powers over the executive branch. Justiciability was sustained on the
basis of a regulation issued by the Attorney General, reporting presidential assurances
that the Special Prosecutor would not be removed except for extraordinary improprieties, and explicitly giving him power to contest claims of executive privilege. United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 694-97 & 694 n.8 (1974).
164. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
165. The men who met in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787 were practical statesmen, experienced in politics, who viewed the principle of separation of powers as a
vital check against tyranny. But they likewise saw that a hermetic sealing off of the
three branches of Government from one another would preclude the establishment of
a Nation capable of governing itself effectively.
Id. at 120-21. The Court cited both the majority opinion in Youngstown and Justice
Jackson's concurrence, without recognizing the inconsistencies between them. Id. at 122-23
(citing 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring) and id. at 587-88 (opinion of Court)).
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From this premise it concluded that any appointee exercising "significant authority" pursuant to federal law was an "Officer of the
United States" who must be appointed in compliance with Article
11.163 The Court would not recognize an exception for the independent agencies, even though their duties might be "'predominantly
quasijudicial and quasilegislative' rather than executive."' 167 It thought
the removal cases were consistent with this conclusion, since they
had carefully distinguished the President's appointments power.1 8
In applying its general principles to the Federal Election Commission, the Court emphasized that the agency possessed prosecutorial
functions, which could be exercised only by "Officers of the United
States." Yet it would create no special exception for rulemaking or
adjudication. 6 9
In refusing to recognize a special preserve for rulemaking or adjudicative functions of agencies, the Buckley Court avoided following
the logic of Humphrey's Executor to its terminus, which would be
complete congressional hegemony over these functions. Instead, the
Court accurately described rulemaking and adjudication as functions
performed by both executive branch and independent agencies, and
did not employ the Humphrey's Executor Court's unrealistic characterization of rulemaking and adjudication as nonexecutive functions.
Like Nixon, Buckley took account of the complexity of relationships
among the branches of government and avoided allowing an undue
concentration of power in any one of them.
The Court also rejected a simplistic view of executive power when
it distinguished between different kinds of executive officials in Elrod
v. Burns. 70 In holding that patronage discharges of public employees
violate the First Amendment, the Court identified justifications for
treating policymaking officials differently from employees with more
limited responsibilities. 1 71 Thus, Elrod vindicates the position of the
dissenters in Myers who argued that not all officers and not all reasons for dismissals ought to be treated the same way. Because the
Elrod Court was willing to permit discharges of policymakers, who
are in a position to "thwart the goals of the in-party,"'' 72 it also might
allow presidential directives affecting rulemaking by the same persons.
166. 424 U.S. at 126.
167.
168.
marily,
169.

Id. at 133 (quoting Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 625 (1935)).
424 U.S. at 135-36. Although the Court distinguished the removal cases sumit seemed to intend to leave their holdings undisturbed.
Id. at 140-41.

170. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
171. Id. at 367-68.
172. Id. at 367.
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E. Evaluating PresidentialInitiatives According to
Separation of Powers Analysis
A simplistic view of separation of powers leads to easy, but unsatisfactory, answers to questions about the scope of presidential power.
It would be simple to tell a President who wants to act without
express authority that he cannot do so, but this does not reflect the
willingness of the Court to find implied presidential powers in particular circumstances.1 73 Similarly, it would be simple to say that a
President must not undertake initiatives that influence the substance
of rulemaking delegated to other agencies of government. Restricting
the President to procedural initiatives would avoid some of the dangers
of special interest influence. 74 It would also avoid overburdening
the presidential staff' 75 and straining the limits of implied powers.1 76
Yet drawing the line between procedural and substantive efforts is
not, in fact, easy, 177 and the Court has indicated that the President
may be authorized to influence the substance of government policy
173. Justice Jackson wrote that, in the twilight zone where the distribution of power
between Congress and the President is uncertain, congressional inertia may enable the
President to act and to defend his act on the basis of immediate imperatives. See pp.
472-73 supra. The majority opinion of the Court in Youngstown did not preclude the
President from acting without specific authority to oversee the execution of many
statutes. See p. 474 supra. More recently, the Court used functional grounds to imply a
limited presidential privilege of confidentiality. See pp. 483-85 supra. And the courts have
often upheld executive orders based on implied statutory authority. See generally Fleishman & Aufses, supra note 94.
174. A presidential order changing an agency's substantive policy may be suspect as
the product of special interest influence; a procedural order setting structures for the
future is essentially neutral as to the interest of particular parties. Cf. Hunter v. Erickson,
393 U.S. 385, 393 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring) (distinguishing between facially discriminatory laws defining institutional structures "with the purpose of aiding one
particular group" and facially neutral laws defining these structures "with the aim of
providing a just framework" for competition among groups).
175. If conducted on a continuing basis, White House formulation of substantive
directives would tend to strain the institutional capacity of the Presidency more than
designing procedural directives would, because substantive orders would often require
particular expertise in technical areas. Agencies, however, can claim some expertise in
procedural as well as substantive matters. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524-25, 543-46 (1978). Substantive
directives occurring only on an occasional basis, not as part of an ambitious program for
coordinating all federal policy, would not overburden the capacity of the Presidency.
176. Statutes granting the President oversight powers with respect to the agencies carry
substantially greater implied authority for procedural directives than for substantive ones.
Indeed, these statutes impose careful limits on the substantive effects of presidential action. See pp. 492-95 infra.
177. An expressly procedural requirement, such as Quality of Life Review, can indirectly but effectively influence the substantive direction of agency policymaking. See
pp. 464-65 supra.
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so long as he does not violate the boundaries set by express congressional policy.

178

Finally, it would be simple to announce that the President cannot
interfere with the operations of independent agencies except with
such explicit authority as the appointments power. This view, however, depends on the false assumption that independent agencies and
executive agencies can always be distinguished. 179 Moreover, it neglects perhaps more subtle, but more meaningful reasons for restricting
presidential influence. Particular agency functions need immunity to
satisfy due process concerns: in adjudicatory proceedings, the parties
need assurance that the judgment will pertain to the merits of their
case, not to external pressures on the judge. 18 0 Certain rulemaking
activities that distribute scarce resources also require protection against
outside influence. Finally, presidential intervention in particular agency functions may have the effect of undermining the capacity of the
courts to review-and constitutionally check-agency decisions.' 8 ' Functional rather than formal distinctions between kinds of agency conduct are necessary to identify these reasons for restricting presidential
influence.
The simplistic view of separation of powers thus is actually difficult
to apply. It is more severely flawed because it deviates from the framers' complex understanding of governmental authority that is shared
by reciprocally limiting branches. The framers' conception is dynamic
and permits change over time, even though the framers themselves
could not have anticipated the rise of the regulatory bureaucracy. 8 2
A case-by-case approach to the scope of presidential power must occur within two general sets of boundaries-those set by the checks and
balances of other branches of government, and those set by the demands of due process. A flexible approach to the President's role in
agency rulemaking may yield explicit principles over time: for ex178. See p. 475 supra (discussing Youngstown); p. 476 & note 121 sutra (discussing
Myers).
179. See p. 480 & notes 142-43 supra.
180. Agency adjudicative functions, such as those of the FTC in Humphrey's Executor
and the War Claims Commission in Wriener, haie due process and statutory protection
against intervention by the President or any other outside party. See pp. 481-83 supra;
5 U.S.C. § 557(d) (1976).
181. Particularly if the presidential intervention is informal, the courts may have
difficulty reviewing it. See pp. 504-05 infra.
182. The law operates best through flexible categories that can accommodate change.
E. Lvi, AN INTRODUcrION TO LEGAL REASONING 4 (1972); see E. BODENHEINIER, JUN1sPRUDENCE 319 (tev. ed. 1974) (blend of rigidity and elasticity in truly great systems of law);
J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 7 (1963) (uncertainty in law has immense social
value for experimentation in response to changing circumstances).
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ample, the Court might conclude that presidential intervention in independent agencies should be limited to actions principally affecting
procedure rather than the substance of policy.8 3 Primarily, however,
the flexible approach must be characterized by estimations of the
balance in given circumstances between the President's concerns and
the countervailing interests of the other branches and of the people.
III. Authority for Presidential Initiatives:
A Functional Analysis
At least six questions should be considered in an evaluation of
the legitimacy of a given presidential initiative aimed at influencing
agency regulatory policy:
(1) is there express or implied statutory authority for the initiative; (2) does the President have the capacity to execute the initiative;
(3) is the initiative best characterized as procedural or substantive;
(4) is the regulatory program suited to presidential intervenltion of
the kind attempted; (5) what protections are accorded to ensure thatthe rulemaking process remains an open one that is fair to those
concerned; and (6) are effective checks by the other branches of
government available.
Because most rulemaking responsibilities are not directly delegated
to the President,8 4 analysis must focus on his implied authority. Also,
although the distinction between procedure and substance is often
elusive, it is useful for analytic purposes to give separate considera183.

See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG. 2D SEss. REPORT ON REGULATORY

AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT (Comm. Print 1960) (Landis Report). The President

restricted Executive Order No. 12,044 to avoid Senate objections to potential substantive
effects on the independent agencies. See p. 466 & note 77 supra.
184. Some statutes do delegate rulemaking authority directly to the President. E.g.,
Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-159, 87 Stat. 627, repealed,

Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 817. In promulgating rules pursuant to these statutes, the President is bound by the policy decisions
embodied in relevant legislation. See p. 475 supra (discussing Youngsown). These
policy decisions may be reflected in the specific statute delegating rulemaking power
to the President, or in the APA's general requirements governing rulemaking. See Soucie
v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (APA applies to President's Office of Science and
Technology); Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 759-61 (D.D.C.
1971) (three-judge court) (suggesting, but not holding, that APA applies to President).
A broad argument can be made that whenever Congress delegates power to an official
other than the President, it intends that power to be exercised free of presidential supervision. There is a similarly broad rejoinder that Congress is presumably aware that Myers
supports presidential authority over officers within the executive branch, so that whenever Congress places a rulemaking program there, it contemplates presidential direction.
Neither argument is conclusive. Congress does not usually consider the issue of presidential
supervision of rulemaking when it passes a statute. This fact accounts for the difficulty of
deciding, for example, whether EPA regulations are subject to presidential intervention.
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tion to the President's power to influence procedure and his power to
influence the substance of regulatory policymaking.
A.

Implied Statutory Authority for Procedural Directives
In the absence of demonstrable congressional intent to deny presidential power, it is necessary to ask whether statutory authority for
presidential action can appropriately be implied. This requires an
inquiry into the policies underlying existing legislation to determine
if the presidential action in question is consistent with them. An
analysis of recent congressional policies supports an implied presidential power to impose procedural requirements on agency rulemaking; other recent statutes may provide a foundation for an implied presidential power to coordinate rulemaking activities.
1. Rulemaking Procedures
Implied authority for President Carter's Executive Order No. 12,044,
which imposed expanded procedural requirements on the rulemaking
activities of federal executive agencies, as5 cannot be found in the
general statute governing agency rulemaking. The APA is silent on
the issue of presidential supervision of rulemaking; moreover, it does
not impose the degree of procedural requirements ordered by the
President.1 80 Yet authority for the President's order can be implied
from recent congressional enactments that have accompanied new
delegations of rulemaking power with special procedures supplementing those in the APA.18 7 Although the new requirements have varied
from statute to statute, there are some common characteristics that
reveal the nature of congressional dissatisfaction with traditional "notice-and-comment" rulemaking. First, Congress has required that an
agency publish advance notice of rulemaking before a proposed rule
is formulated and published. 88 This gives the public an opportunity
to participate in the critical early stages of the drafting process. Second, Congress has required notices of proposed rules to be accompanied by statements of basis and purpose, including underlying
factual data and methodology, legal interpretations, and policy considerations. 8 9 Third, Congress has set a minimum duration for
185. See p. 463 supra.
186. See pp. 465-66 supra.
187. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES, sui5ra note 68, § 6.01-4.
188. E.g., Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972, § 7(b), 15 U.S.C. § 2056(b) (1976).
189. E.g., Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977, § 501, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7191
(a)(2) (West Supp. 1977); Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § 305(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7607
(d)(3) (West Supp. 1977).
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the public comment period'0 0 and has prescribed new procedures
for it, including the maintenance of a public docket of relevant materials and comments and the holding of oral hearings.' 9 ' These hearings may feature some characteristics of adjudication, such as limited
rights to cross-examine or to rebut other participants. Fourth, Congress has required more elaborate statements of basis for final rules,
including findings of disputed facts and responses to significant comments. 92 Fifth, Congress has subjected rules to more stringent judicial review 93 and has defined a rulemaking record for that review.
The record consists essentially of the agency's basis statements and
supporting documents and the materials produced by its public proceedings. 194 Finally, Congress has subjected a number of rulemaking
programs to congressional review for a possible legislative veto. 195
With these new definitions of the procedural requisites of rulemaking, Congress has revealed two broad purposes, which respond to the
calls for regulatory reform. Provisions designed to strengthen public
participation in rulemaking seek to increase the political *accountability of the agencies. Other techniques for achieving greater political accountability, such as the legislative veto, emphasize congressional oversight. 190 By requiring explanations for agency rules and
a record that facilitates judicial review, Congress is trying to improve
agency accountability and also to ensure that rules are rational and
legally justifiable.
The purposes and techniques of these procedural innovations by
Congress establish a foundation for implied presidential authority
to promulgate Executive Order No. 12,044. The Order advances the
policies of political accountability and rationality that underlie the
new statutory procedures; all of its requirements can find a statutory
97
analogue.
190. E.g., Education Amendments of 1974, § 509, 20 U.S.C. § 1232(b) (1976).
191. E.g., Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1975, § 202(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ 57a (1976); Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977, § 501, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7191(c)
(West Supp. 1977); Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § 305(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7607(d)(5)
(West Supp. 1977).
192. E.g., Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972, § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 2058(c) (1976); Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977, § 501, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7191(d) (West Supp. 1977);
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § 305(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7607(d)(6) (West Supp. 1977).
193. E.g., Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1975, § 202(a), 15 U.S.C.

§ 57a (1976).

194. E.g., Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § 305(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7607(d)(7) (West
Supp. 1977).
195. See Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 17, at 1371.
196. See generally 2 STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, supra note 16.
197. Regulatory analyses required by the Order resemble environmental impact statements, see 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970), and its requirements that agencies review existing
rules resemble those in 20 U.S.C. § 1232 (1976) (publication and opportunity for comment
requirements for education programs).
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In addition, special characteristics of the President's office support
his assertion of a role in advancing the accountability and coordination of rulemaking. The President and his staff seem as competent
as Congress to design and implement procedural requirements. Moreover, executive orders have a flexibility not shared by legislationif the orders prove ill-advised, they can be rescinded at the stroke
of a pen. Still, Congress has not yet decided to apply its new procedures generically by amending the APA, and requirements such
as those in the Order will impose substantial new burdens on affected
agencies. In the absence of an indication that congressional inaction
is itself a considered policy judgment, however, the President should
be found to have the implied authority to take the initiative, at least
for the executive branch. 198
There is even a colorable argument that the new rulemaking statutes
carry implied authority for the President to apply the Order to the
independent agencies. Congress has applied its new procedures to executive branch and independent agencies alike. The new procedures
emphasize public participation in rulemaking and thereby dilute
the theory of agency expertise that has accounted for the creation of
the independent agencies. In statutes specifically concerning the President's relations with independent agencies, however, Congress has
reaffirmed its traditional stance that these agencies should be protected from presidential direction except as specifically authorized. 199
2.

The President's Statutory Powers
The President has explicit authority to impound program funds
under certain circumstances, to reorganize the agencies within statutory limits, to review budget requests of most agencies, and to appoint chairmen of major independent agencies. The statutes assigning these powers carefully limit them to chiefly procedural matters,
but they may support some presidential initiatives to affect policymaking.
198. There is support for such an approach in a recent Supreme Court case upholding an Executive Order governing labor-management relations of federal employees. See
Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 273-74 & n.5 (1974). The Court
noted the similarity of the Order to national labor legislation and found authority
for it in 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1976), authorizing the President to "prescribe regulations for
the conduct of employees in the executive branch."
199. See pp. 493-94 infra. Other statutory guarantees of agency independence include
recent provisions for some agencies to conduct their own litigation, thereby removing
preexisting control by the Department of Justice. See 5 STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION,
supra note 16, at xii, 25-26, 35 n.52, 42-43, 54-62.
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a. Impoundment
The controversy that arose over President Nixon's power to impound funds appropriated for government programs resulted in the
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974.200 In
1
light of his earlier assertions of nearly limitless impoundment power,20
President Nixon's signing of the bill during the last weeks of his
Presidency seemed to be a gesture of surrender.
Yet the Act did not entirely eliminate presidential power to influence the flow of funds. For any complete rescission of appropriations by the President, the statute requires the affirmative approval
of both houses of Congress, which is equivalent to rescission by
statute. 20 2 Thus, the rescission authority does not confer substantial
power on the President, but it does give him the opportunity to
take the initiative.
In its deferral provisions, the Act accords the President greater
although still limited power to interrupt the funding of a given program for reasons such as fiscal policy. 20 3 Subject to a one-house legislative veto, 20 4 the President is authorized to affect levels of program
implementation and enforcement by deferring the expenditure of
appropriated funds for the remainder of the current fiscal year.20 5
b.

Reorganization

At any particular time, the status of the longstanding contest between Congress and the President over custody of the agencies can
be judged by congressional willingness to grant the President reorganization authority. 20 6 Congress has recently shown signs of willingness to grant the President some managerial authority in its renewal
of his authority to prepare government reorganization plans. The
plans, which take effect if not vetoed by either house of Congress
within a stated period,20 7 may, within specified limits, transfer, consolidate, or abolish agency functions.
A principal limit is the statute's prohibition against the abolition
200. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1407 (Supp. V 1975).
201. See Van Alstyne, supra note 162, at 789.
202. 31 U.S.C. § 1402(b) (Supp. V 1975) (President's proposed budget rescission or
reservation is effective only with endorsement of both houses within 45 days of its announcement).
203. The President must inform Congress of the reasons for proposing a deferral, "including any legal authority invoked by him to justify the proposed deferral." Id. § 1403(a).
204. Id. § 1403(b) (either house may pass resolution disapproving proposed deferral).
205. Id. § 1403(a) (President is authorized to propose budget deferral but it is limited
to end of same fiscal year).
206. See generally Karl, supra note 149.
207. Reorganization Act of 1977, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 901-912 (West 1977).
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of any "enforcement function or statutory program." 20 s This exception was apparently intended to prevent reorganization plans from
having excessive "substantive" effects. 209 The President may not abolish or transfer all of the functions of an executive department or independent regulatory agency; nor may he consolidate any two such
agencies. 210 Thus, established policy may not be abandoned, the independent agencies may not be eliminated, and reorganization plans
may not be implemented without passing the gauntlet of the legislative veto.
Aside from these exceptions, the Act recognizes presidential power
to transfer or to abolish some rulemaking activities, 211 and to achieve
limited reorganization of both executive and independent agencies.
Although the President's power is carefully restricted, the Act does
21 2
allow actions that have indirect substantive effects on policymaking.
208. Id. § 903(a)(2).
209. Professor Tribe warned the House committee reviewing the bill that a reorganization power that included authority to abolish programs "could dramatically affect 'the
substantive rights and interests of the governed' "; therefore, he argued, the reorganization power should not encompass authority to "abolish, separate, or consolidate functions
in such a way as to create a significant risk that any existing act of Congress would be
rendered substantively less effective or more difficult to enforce." H.R. REP. No. 105,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 54-56.
The House Report explained that the statutory grant of reorganization power must
not authorize the President to interfere with agency enforcement functions such as civil
rights protection and law enforcement; nor may the power threaten programs such as
environmental protection, social security, and school lunches, because these programs
were created by Congress and should be abolished only by Congress. Id. at 6-7, reprinted
in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 41, 46.
Congress may also have been responding to a constitutional concern. The Attorney
General expressed the opinion that the legislative veto would be constitutional only in
the context of the reorganization statute because the President's powers under that
statute would affect legislative programs only indirectly through internal reorganization
of the executive branch. Id. at 10-11, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
50-51.
210. 5 U.S.C.A. § 905(a)(1) (West 1977). Professor Tribe suggested that the risks of
substantive effects could be reduced if Congress specified that "no reorganization plan
submitted under the statute's authority may transfer a function from an independent
agency or commission to an agency or branch of an executive department." H.R. REP.
No. 105, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 17, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 56.
Congress partially accepted this suggestion. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 905(a)(1) (West 1977). As the
committee observed:
The bill recognizes the unique status of the independent regulatory agencies and
their special relationship to the Congress by providing that the whole of independent
regulatory agencies or all of their functions may not be abolished or transferred nor
may two or more such agencies or all their functions be consolidated. This does not
mean that such agencies are totally exempt from reorganization authority, but such
authority is limited as described heretofore.
H.R. REP. No. 105, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 47.
211. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 903(a)(2) (West 1977).
212. For example, the President can transfer rulemaking programs from one agency
to another having a different policy orientation. See id.
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Indeed, the Act affirms congressional support of more efficient management of executive functions. 213 In this general sense, it recognizes
policy coordination as a legitimate presidential activity.
Office of Management and Budget

c.

Since its inception, OMB, part of the Executive Office of the
President, has possessed the power to control the budgetary and legislative requests of federal agencies to Congress. 214 Most of the independent regulatory agencies have been subject to OMB review.2 1
This congressional delegation of budgetary powers to the President
stands as a tacit admission of Congress's difficulties in setting budgetary
priorities. Like impoundment, however, this review is mainly a negative restraint on policymaking, and Congress remains free to depart
from administration requests by entertaining any proposal it chooses.
Still, through OMB, the President has a significant impact on policymaking. He is also authorized to order detailed OMB studies of
agency efficiency in order to support appropriate recommendations
216
to Congress.
d.

Chairmanships

The President selects the chairmen of the major independent regulatory agencies from among their members.21 7 Particularly under recent reorganization plans, the chairmen, in turn, have important powers over agency policy, personnel, and spending.218 This appointments
power therefore gives the President some indirect control over the
course of agency policy. Congress has, however, recently limited the
219
President's power to select some agency chairmen..
Considered together, the foregoing statutes authorize the President
to affect rulemaking by transferring programs among agencies, by
abolishing some rulemaking functions, by deferring spending, by
withholding the administration's support from agency budget and
213. Id. § 901(a) (statement of purpose).

214. See W. CARY, POLITICS AND THE REGULATORY AGENCIES 6-8, 11-12 (1967); Dixon,
The Independent Commissions and Political Responsibility, 27 An. L. REv. 1, 6-8 (1975).
215. Congress has recently excepted some independent agencies from 0MB review.
E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2076(k) (1976) (Consumer Product Safety Commission); 31 U.S.C.A. § 11(j)
(West Supp. 1977) (ICC).
216. 31 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
217. Dixon, supra note 214, at 8 & n.30.
218. Zamir, Administrative Control of Administrative Action, 57 CALIF. L. Rav. 896,
898-99 & n.161 (1969).
219. Act of Nov. 16, 1977, § 204(a), Pub. L. No. 95-188, 91 Stat. 1388 (requiring Senate's
advice and consent to appointment of Federal Reserve Board chairman); 15 U.S.C. § 2053
(1976) (setting fixed term to tenure of Consumer Product Safety Commission chairman).
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legislative requests, and by selecting agency chairmen. These powers
allow the President to exert indirect but significant influence on
agency policymaking. More importantly, they acknowledge the President's role as the official who looks at government as a whole and
seeks to achieve coordination, efficiency, and a coherent set of priorities.
These statutory policies, together with those underlying the new statutory rulemaking procedures, provide ample justification for presidential imposition of procedural directives such as Executive Order No.
2 20
12,044 on executive branch agencies..
B.

Substantive Directives

A number of considerations need to be balanced before the legitimacy of a substantive presidential directive can be established. The
policies behind the particular agency program must be weighed against
the President's justifications for affecting it. Presidential justifications
can include the factual foundation for the initiative and also the relation between the issue at hand and the President's role in the constitutional scheme. The President's justifications must, however, also
be evaluated in light of the availability of checks by the other branches
of government and the opportunity for public notice of the basis
for the presidential action. The general guidelines suggested here outline the kind of reasoning that can be applied to these balancing considerations. They are based on the willingness of federal courts to
imply authority for presidential action and on the functional concerns
that contribute to judicial analysis.
The President should have his broadest authority over rulemaking
in the military and foreign affairs areas. Here his constitutional power
is greatest, and broad statutory delegations of power reflect congressional recognition that wide-ranging executive discretion is appropriate. Indeed, because military or foreign affairs functions are excepted from the APA's notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements, -2 1
procedure as well as substance should usually be within executive
branch control.
Emergencies should also justify relatively drastic presidential action.
Thus, the fuel crisis of 1973 might have supported presidential orders
to various agencies to change rules in order to aid conservation. For
example, the President might have ordered the EPA to delay some
of its rules that protect public health at the cost of greater fuel usage.
220. Thus, the President might offer the techniques for coordinating policy found in
the Order as a less drastic alternative to consolidating some rulemaking programs.
221. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(I) (1976).
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He might have voided or suspended the ICC's rules that force some
trucks to return empty from trips delivering goods. Both kinds of
initiative would have been subject to judicial review; the limits set by
Youngstown require that the President act within the parameters set by
the governing statutes. Intervention with the ICC would raise the
additional question of whether the President could intrude into the
affairs of an independent agency; presumably, the Commission's independent status would be given some weight in the judicial balance
of competing considerations, but that status would not necessarily be
determinative of the outcome.
Economic emergencies would also provide a plausible justification
for broad presidential intervention. In the past, Presidents have been
delegated broad powers to seek economic stabilization, and the courts
have upheld the equally broad executive orders implementing those
statutes. 2 22 This historical delegation of broad economic stabilization
powers may be combined with other justifications for presidential involvement in economic regulation even in times not heavy with crisis.
Some economic regulation, such as the discount rate set by the
Federal Reserve Board (FRB), 223 has critical importance for the entire economy and affects many decisions within the executive branch.
Although this FRB activity is protected by statute from presidential
interference, a particular instance of economic decline may approach
crisis proportions and call for a presidential initiative. In addition to
citing existing circumstances and the history of broad congressional
delegations of economic powers, the President could draw some support for intervention from congressional approval of his role in coordinating federal fiscal policy through budgetary and impoundment
powers. 224 The countervailing argument that the FRB was intended
by Congress to be immune from any outside intervention thus might
be overcome in an exceptional case.
Aside from these situations of potential national emergency, the
President should be able to assert extensive implied authority to
protect individual rights. Presidents have often used executive orders
to advance civil rights-for example, by requiring government con222. See Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971) (threejudge court); Fleishman & Aufses, supra note 94, at 25-31.
223. See 12 U.S.C. § 357 (1976).
224. See pp. 492, 494 supra; Memorandum for S. LAZARUS, Associate Director, Domestic
Council, Re: President's Authority to impose procedural reforms on the Independent
Regulatory Agencies, from J. Harmon, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel
(July 22, 1977). Congress has already autihorized presidential orders directing the FRB to
control the availability of credit during inflationary periods. 12 U.S.C. § 1904(a) (1976).
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tracts to contain provisions forbidding employment discrimination by
contractors-and courts have been generous in implying statutory au22 5
thority for them.
In contrast, presidential action that threatens individual constitutional rights should be confined or entirely forbidden. Thus, in
Cole v. Young 220 the Supreme Court held that an Executive Order
providing for summary "national security" dismissals of public employees throughout the government was not authorized by a statute
providing for such dismissals from sensitive positions in certain agencies such as the State Department. In the absence of demonstrated
necessity, the Court was unwilling to find statutory authority to dilute
227
procedural safeguards surrounding dismissals.
There are other rulemaking activities, such as many of the Federal
Communications Commission's (FCC) rules, that affect sensitive constitutional issues in ways that seem inconsistent with presidential supervision. Maintaining the delicate balance between First Amendment
rights of broadcasters, of those desiring access to the airwaves, and of
the public does not seem to be an enterprise suited to presidential
supervision. 228 Presidential intervention in FCC rulemaking would
be particularly inappropriate when the President himself is an in229
terested party.
In this vein, when an independent agency-or an executive agency
-employs rulemaking that is functionally similar to adjudication,
presidential supervision is difficult to justify. Individual constitutional
rights to due process230 could be offended by presidential intervention
into rulemaking that allocates a valuable benefit among a few interested parties. 23 ' The significant fact here is not that the agency
225. See United States v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 553 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1977),
vacated and remanded, 98 S. Ct. 2841 (1978); Fleishman & Ausfes, supra note 94, at 19-25.
226. 351 U.S. 536 (1956).
227. Id. at 546-47. Although the President's constitutional powers were not asserted in
Cole, the case suggests that his powers over foreign affairs and over executive branch
officers must be reconciled with due process rights of public employees. Id. at 557 n.20.
228. See generally Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412
U.S. 94 (1973). FCC controversies not implicating free speech, however, should not receive
special treatment. Robinson, supra note 28, at 209-10.
229. See 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) ("equal time" provision). The President
could be interested personally or as head of his political party. Just as adjudicators are
forbidden on due process grounds to have a personal interest in the outcome of their
decisions, self-interested presidential intervention would appear to violate constitutional
protections. See, e.g., Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973). Rulemaking by the Federal
Election Commission would present similar problems.
230. See pp. 481-83 supra (discussing due process element in removal cases).
231. See Sangamon Valley Television Corp. v. United States, 269 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 915 (1964) (assignment of television channels, though conducted through rulemaking, merits fundamental due process protection against ex parte
contacts).
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may be called "independent" but that its conduct is sufficiently "quasi2 32
judicial" to warrant due process protections.
C. Authority to Influence Independent Agencies
Implicit in this functional analysis is the view that the traditional
distinction between the executive branch and the independent agencies
should not conclusively determine the availability of presidential supervision. Because this view challenges the Court's constitutional interpretations, it deserves explicit discussion.
First, the traditional distinction would permit unrestrained presidential influence over regulatory policymaking by agencies located in
the executive branch. The functional approach, in contrast, identifies
tasks such as adjudication that should be protected from outside interference, whether they are performed by an executive branch or
an independent agency. This approach draws support from dicta
in Myers to the effect that presidential supervision of officers should
vary with the function involved, and that adjudication is among the
matters that may appropriately be committed to the sole discretion
of an agency. 233 Therefore there seems to be no bar to the view that
the President's constitutional powers over the executive branch are
not plenary, and instead should follow the functional analysis suggested
above.
The independent agencies present more difficult constitutional issues. Before reaching them, a court must conclude that the statutes forbid the presidential action at issue. On statutory grounds, independent
agencies have been granted protection from presidential involvement
in order to ensure two goals: insulation of adjudication from outside
influence and development of expertise and stability. The first purpose may be achieved by excepting agency adjudication from presidential supervision. The second is more difficult to accommodate with
even a limited presidential role. Although Congress no longer treats
the independent agencies as remote bodies of experts entitled to com232. In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978), the Supreme Court suggested that although due process strictures
do not apply to most rulemaking, there may be exceptions:
In prior opinions we have intimated that even in a rulemaking proceeding when
an agency is making a "'quasi-judicial'" determination by which a very small
number of persons are "'exceptionally affected, in each case upon individual
grounds,"' in some circumstances additional procedures may be required in order to
afford the aggrieved individuals due process.
Id. at 542 (citations omitted).
233.
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plete insulation, it has continued to reiterate explicitly its intent to
forbid presidential supervision of these agencies. 234 Thus, it would
unduly strain statutory interpretation to justify the application of
presidential directives to independent agencies on that basis.
Constitutional analysis of the problem is also problematic because
the dicta of Humphrey's Executor extend complete protection to independent agencies. In accordance with the functional approach to
presidential power that the Court has adopted more recently, 233 the
Court should limit Humphrey's Executor to its holding at the next
opportunity. Giving some deference to congressional intent to insulate
an independent agency,23 6 the Court should articulate presidential
powers that are "not fixed but fluctuate," 23 7 depending on the justification for their exercise in a given situation. The Court should
seek to determine whether a particular rulemaking program has been
placed in an independent agency because its nature renders presidential intervention inappropriate, or whether the placement reflects
only a tradition of placing similar programs in that particular agency.
For example, many of the FRB's functions reside in an independent
agency because public confidence in the integrity of FRB actions is
paramount. Presidential intervention in any but extraordinary cases
might badly damage the agency's capacity to perform. In contrast,
many functions entrusted to the ICC or FTC could as well be performed by an executive branch agency.
It is easier to justify the imposition of procedural rather than substantive presidential directives on independent agencies.2 38 Executive
Order No. 12,044 serves special presidential interests in accountability
and coordination, and accordingly could be subsumed under his power
to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed. ' 2 3 9 The Order
would have some substantive effects on independent agency policymaking, but its major thrust is procedural. It is therefore not a severe
intrusion on the discretion of these agencies and should be upheld
if applied to them.
234. See p. 481 supra.
235. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
236. The Court should act with some deference to this congressional view of the inappropriateness of presidential supervision of a program, as it traditionally does for
legislative judgments. But deference here should be relatively slight, since this particular
kind of judgment is the resolution of a separation of powers issue regarding which Congress has long sought to protect its own power at the expense of the President. See generally Karl, supra note 149.
237. The phrase is Justice Jackson's. See p. 473 supra.
238. See pp. 466-67 supra.
239. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 3.
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D. Procedural Constraints on PresidentialInvolvement
By virtue of his position, the President who chooses to become involved in the substance or procedure of rulemaking by the federal
agencies is certain to have significant influence. The temptation to
resort to informal contacts between White House staff and agency
personnel will be great; such contacts may be secret, unreviewable,
and harmful to the rights of interested persons to fair treatment.
In a series of recent decisions, the federal courts have extended fairness protections traditionally characteristic of adjudication 240 to rulemaking 241 and other informal executive actions242 to guard against
inappropriate influences in agency policymaking. 243 Although the
240. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. FTC, 354 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1966). In Pillsbury, the
court forbade congressional intrusion in an agency adjudication. Congressmen had urged
commissioners and agency counsel during open hearings to adopt a particular interpretation of antitrust law. Because the hearings focused on a case pending before the agency,
the court found that Congress impaired the impartiality of the commissioners, and
emphasized that Congress was "no longer intervening in the agency's legislative function,
but rather, in its judicial function." Id. at 964 (emphasis in original). But see FTC v.
Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948) (commissioners remain qualified to decide case despite
expressions of general policy preconceptions so long as their minds remain open).
241. In Sangamon Valley Television Corp. v. United States, 269 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 915 (1964), the court found that ex parte contacts must be
prohibited when the interests involved in rulemaking resemble those typically involved
in adjudication. Secret ex parte contacts and minor favors by a party interested in obtaining an opportunity to seek a VHF television channel through an FCC rulemaking
proceeding allocating channels among cities were held to be impermissible; the court
concluded that "whatever the proceeding may be called . . . basic fairness requires [that
it] be carried on in the open" if it involves the "resolution of conflicting private claims
to a valuable privilege." Id. at 224. The basis for the decision is unclear in that the court
suggested not only constitutional and statutory grounds, but also that the ex parte contacts violated the agency's own rules. Id. at 224-25.
242. In D.C. Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 1030 (1972), the reviewing court invalidated the decision of the Secretary of
Transportation to approve construction of Three Sisters Bridge across the Potomac River.
The court held that a congressman's threats to delay appropriations for Washington's
subway system until the Secretary approved the bridge construction had intruded a factor
not authorized by statute into the Secretary's decision. Id. at 1245-46. The court remarked
that if the Secretary's action had been "purely legislative," it might have been valid
despite the presence of "extraneous pressures," id. at 1247. For this proposition, it cited
cases refusing to consider the motives of elected legislatures. These were not directly in
point, however, because appointed bureaucrats exercising delegated powers are confined
to the grounds for decision authorized by statute. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,
Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) ("the court must consider whether the decision
was based on a consideration of the relevant factors").
243. In United States Lines, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n., Nos. 76-2004 & 77-1470
(D.C. Cir. 1978), the court noted that the "quasi-adjudicatory" procedure in question had
to be protected against ex parte communications because the impact of the agency action
would extend "well beyond the immediate parties involved." The court noted that "however we label the proceedings involved here and in our earlier cases, the common theme
remains: that ex parte communications and agency secrecy as to their substance and
existence serve effectively to deprive the public of the right to participate meaningfully in
the decisionmaking process." Id. slip op. at 38-39 (citation omitted).
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Supreme Court has set limits on judicial creativity in this area, 244
and Congress has refrained from imposing on rulemaking the exact
procedural protections accorded to agency adjudication, 2 45 the demands of essential fairness in agency conduct suggest that ex parte
contacts by anyone, including the President, must be controlled in
some fashion. This conclusion, along with the tension created by limitations on the judicial role in this area, is portrayed by two recent
decisions by the District of Columbia Circuit.
First, in Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC,246 the court invalidated

the FCC's rules for pay television, in part because of repeated ex parte
communications between commissioners and both private interests and
congressmen. 247 The FCC admitted that although it had attempted
to make fair allocations of time for public oral argument on its proposed rules, it had often allowed argument to continue ex parte, with
compromise positions and the "real facts" reserved for the private
sessions. 2 48 The court advanced several reasons for disapproving this
practice. 249 First, if the positions taken by interested persons in private
discussions differed from their public stance, statutorily mandated
public procedures would be reduced to "a sham." Second, a court
could not effectively review an agency's decision for arbitrariness or
inconsistency with statutory authority when the record omitted "relevant information that has been presented" to the agency. Third, the
inability of opposing parties to respond to secret presentations would
deprive the agency of the benefits of the "adversarial discussion" contemplated by notice-and-comment procedures. Finally, the court con244. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519 (1978); see pp. 459-61 suPra.
245. Congress's codification in 5 U.S.C.A. § 557(d) (West Supp. 1977) of Pillsbury's ban
on ex parte influence in adjudication explicitly refrained from extending statutory protection to pure rulemaking. Early versions of this statute proscribed ex parte contracts in
informal rulemaking; the provision was deleted. See S. 260, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. § 202,
119 CONG. REc. 647-51 (1973); H.R. 1000, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(a), 119 CONG. REc. 28,
169-70 (1973); Hearings on Government in the Sunshine Before the Subcomm. on Reorganization, Research, and International Organizations of the Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 189-254 (1974); SENATE COsM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS,
93D CONG., IsT Sass., GOVERNMENT IN THE SUNSHINE: RESPONSES TO SUBCOMMITTEE QUESTIONNAIRE (Comm. Print 1973). It is becoming evident, however, that a strict theoretical
dichotomy between rulemaking and adjudication is unsound. See Nathanson, supra note
46, at 724-27; Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing", 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1309-10 (1975).
246. 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
247. There had been a series of meetings between commissioners and private interests,
from which public interest intervenors had been conspicuously absent. See id. at 51-53. In
addition, broadcasters had approached "key members of Congress," who had pressured
the FCC to maintain its restrictions on pay television's access to movies. Id. at 52 nn.109
& 112.
248. Id. at 53 n.117.

249. Id. at 53-56.
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cluded that secret ex parte communications in rulemaking conflict
with "fundamental notions of fairness implicit in due process and
with the ideal of reasoned decisionmaking on the merits which under250
girds all of our administrative law."
As a prospective remedy, the Home Box Office court issued a broad
directive governing the agency's rulemaking. The court ordered agency members involved in the decisional process of a rulemaking proceeding to refuse to permit ex parte contacts; the court announced
that if such contacts do occur, they should be recorded and made part
of the public file established for each rulemaking docket. 251
In Action for Children's Television v. FCC,252 (ACT) another panel
of the same circuit court refused to apply the Home Box Office rule
retroactively to an FCC decision to suspend a rulemaking proceeding
that had been reached in a private meeting between agency and broadcast representatives. Despite the ex parte contacts, the court in ACT
refused to invalidate the FCC's decision to allow issues concerning
the content of children's television to be temporarily resolved by industry self-regulation. Yet the common ground between ACT and
Home Box Office is as important as their differences. The court emphasized its confidence that the actual basis of the agency's decision
250. Id. at 56. The court thus flirted with a constitutional ground for its decision. It
may have stopped short because of the Supreme Court's suggestion in United States v.
Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 256 (1973), that due process is inapplicable to rulemaking. Vermont Yankee has since reiterated the point. 435 U.S. at 543.
251. See 567 F.2d at 57 (citation omitted):
Once a notice of proposed rulemaking has been issued . . . any agency official or
employee who is or may reasonably be expected to be involved in the decisional
process of the rulemaking proceeding, should "refus[e] to discuss matters relating to
the disposition of a [rulemaking proceeding] with any interested private party, or an
attorney or agent for any such party, prior to the [agency's] decision
** ," Executive Order 11920, § 4 . . . . If ex parte contacts nonetheless occur, we think that any
written document or a summary of any oral communication must be placed in the
public file established for each rulemaking docket immediately after the communication is received so that interested parties may comment thereon. Compare Executive
Order 11920, § 5 ....
Drawing on Executive Order No. 11,920, the court applied it beyond its terms, which
bar ex parte presentations to White House staff during the time that international air
route certifications are before the President for his approval. See 41 Fed. Reg. 23,665
(1976). Because the Executive Order is tailored to a decision that resembles an adjudication in that a few parties are competing for a valuable license, and in that it is conducted
as an adjudication at the agency level, the Home Box Office court extended the Order
beyond its origin in applying it to all rulemaking. See generally Note, Section 801 of the
Federal Aviation Act-The President and the Award of International Air Routes to
Domestic Carriers: A Proposal for Change, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 517 (1970); Comment,
PresidentialPowers over the Awarding of International Air Routes, 48 TUL. L. REv. 1176
(1974).
252. 564 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1977). See also the special concurring opinion filed by
MacKinnon, J., in Home Box Office, 567 F.2d at 61-64, retreating from the broadly
stated per curiam decision that he had earlier joined.

502

Presidential Power
was explained fully and sufficiently within the confines of the rulemaking record, and that interests not present at the critical meeting
2 53
had a full opportunity to comment on the wisdom of self-regulation.
In short, unlike the situation in Home Box Office, the facts did not
suggest that participants in public rulemaking proceedings had been
unfairly treated, or that reasons unknown to interested parties may
have accounted for the agency's final decision. The fundamental premises of the two decisions thus largely coincided; the dispute was over
the authority and necessity for Home Box Office's broad remedy.
Similarly, in its recent Vermont Yankee decision, the Supreme Court
clearly disapproved of Home Box Office's remedial creativity by holding that lower federal courts may not order agencies to engage in rulemaking procedures not specified in the APA or another governing
statute. 25 4 At the same time, the Vermont Yankee Court held that
the court of appeals must review agency rules in light of the administrative record 2 5 and must set them aside under the APA if "arbitrary,
capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion." 2501 The Court recognized that
it is often difficult to distinguish the legitimate judicial invalidation
of a rule for insufficient explanation from the forbidden imposition
of special procedures on agency rulemaking.25 7 Thus, if facts similar
to those of Home Box Office lead a reviewing court to void a resulting
rule, it may be difficult to ascertain whether the court is merely asking that the record contain the rule's real basis, or whether it is
ordering the agency to ban further ex parte activity. Vermont Yankee
has created an uneasy distinction between reviewing the adequacy of
an agency's record and requiring special procedures.
The central problem is one of reconciling the APA's judicial review
requirements with its rulemaking procedures, which do not define
a record for review. 5s The Court has repeatedly adverted to the "administrative record," but this does not explain whether that record
must contain all ex parte information reaching the agency. There
are strong arguments that not every such item need enter the record:
the Vermont Yankee Court emphasized both the need for preserving
the procedural flexibility of informal rulemaking 259 and the inappli253. 564 F.2d at 471-73, 477-78.
254. See p. 460 supra.
255. 435 U.S. at 549 (citing Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 143 (1973)); see Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971) (Court reviews "full administrative record").
256. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976).
257. 435 U.S. at 539-41.
258. See p. 453 supra.
259. 435 U.S. at 547.
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cability of due process strictures to most rulemaking. 26 0 Moreover,
Congress's decision not to extend its recent prohibition of ex parte
contacts in adjudication to rulemaking at least means that it does not
consider an unqualified ban to be appropriate in that context. 261 Nevertheless, the procedures employed in rulemaking must satisfy the
goals of essential fairness that both Congress and the courts have
pursued in recent years. Home Box Office makes clear that ex parte
contacts can impair these central goals of fairness to interested persons, reasoned agency decisionmaking based on some kind of a record,
and ease of judicial review.
The threat to these fairness goals is particularly severe if the President is involved in the ex parte contacts. His personal and institutional
power potentially can deflect an agency from a decision that is otherwise consistent with both the record before it and the governing
statute. Although deviation from such a decision may be supported
by other evidence in the record and elements of the governing statute,
essential fairness may be violated if the deviation resulted' from a
262
President's desire to advance a particular interest.
Because of this danger, it is necessary to impose procedural rules
for presidential intervention similar to those mandated by the Home
Box Office court, 265 with one principal difference. Instead of seeking
to prevent ex parte communications from the White House during
the rulemaking period, they should be encouraged but channeled into
the public record. This approach would permit White House participation but also would make possible meaningful judicial review
264
and would promote the likelihood that the proceedings are fair.
Two countervailing considerations must be reckoned with in formulating this approach; one is practical, the other legal. First, it seems
impracticable to require a complete public record of every instance
of presidential participation in rulemaking. Must every presidential
260.
261.

Id. at 542-44.
See p. 501 supra.

262. The incident described at p. 466 sutra may be an example of this. See also pp.
464-65 supra for problems in the implementation of "Quality of Life" review.
263. After Vermont Yankee, the courts are not free to impose such a requirement. Any
presidential initiative for substantive review of rulemaking should impose it by executive
order, to maintain fairness and to avoid judicial invalidation of rules affected by ex parte
contacts. Such an order should be accorded binding effect until rescinded. See generally
Note, Violations by Agencies of Their Own Regulations, 87 HARv. L. Rav. 629 (1974).
264. Presidential orders that require an agency to change its internal procedures for
rulemaking, for example by issuing regulatory analyses with rules, presumably would not
engender ex parte contacts regarding particular rules. To the extent that procedural
requirements produce ex parte contacts, those communications should be included in the
approach explained here.
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remark after a Cabinet meeting and every newspaper report of White
House reaction to a proposed rule be included if they reach the rulemaker? The core purpose behind placing communications on the
record would call for a formal means of communicating White House
views to the rulemaking agency; whether in the form of written submissions or meetings, these contacts should be on the record. 265 Surrounding informal contacts should not be prohibited if information
and policy analysis are to flow freely to and from the rulemaking agency. The requirement of putting all communications on the record
could be met if written documents and summaries of oral contacts were
added to the public record for each rulemaking docket. Until individual agencies develop clear procedures for these matters,2 6 6 common
sense dictates that any communication adding something new ought
to be placed on the record, especially if there seems any likelihood
267
that the agency will rely on it in its formulation of the final rule.
Even some duplicate material should be placed on the record if it
comes from a new source-like the White House-that may contribute
determinative influence. These techniques would help to ensure that
the record reflects all significant influences on a rule.
This approach could be undermined by the doctrine of executive
privilege defined in United States v. Nixon. 218 Nixon, however, does
not support a limitless executive privilege for communications addressed throughout the executive establishment; the case focused on
deliberations within the White House. Indeed, the Court held that
unless linked to a particular need to protect military secrets or the
like, the privilege would not overcome a demonstrated need for disclosure. This suggests that absent a particular need for secrecy, Nixon
does not support confidentiality for presidential participation in rule2 69
making.
What approach to ex parte contacts should govern the communications of other agencies participating in interagency review? Although
265. Meetings may produce either transcripts or minutes. Congress has recently prescribed procedures for preserving the contents of closed meetings. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)
(1977).
266. The FTC has already adopted constraints on ex parte communications in its rulemaking that are similar to those described in text. See 16 C.F.R. § 4.7 (1978). Other
agencies have begun to regulate ex parte communications with varying degrees of
stringency. See 14 C.F.R. § 300.2-.3 (1978) (CAB); 17 C.F.R. § 200.111 (1977) (SEC); 29
C.F.R. § 2200.103 (1977) (Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission).
267. It appears that the ACT court concluded that the private meeting was not
determinative of the agency decision while the Home Box Office court concluded that the
agency did rely on ex parte contacts in that case.
268. 418 U.S. 683 (1974); see pp. 483-84 suPra.
269. Similarly, Congress does not enjoy special confidentiality for its contacts during
agency decisionmaking. See notes 240, 242 supra.
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pressure from agencies other than the White House does not pose so
great a threat to the integrity of the rulemaking process because less leverage is present, there remains ample reason to require the process to
be open. As the history of OMB's "Quality of Life" review demonstrates, agencies differ in their policy orientation and in their responsiveness to constituent interest groups; moreover, they do not lack
the means to harm one another in the bureaucracy. 70 Interagency
pressure is effective enough to warrant its placement on the record
where it can be seen.2 7x This seems the only way to reconcile the
sometimes conflicting overall purposes of ensuring both the political
accountability and the legality of agency rules.
E.

ConstitutionalChecks on PresidentialPower

The federal courts and Congress must be able to check presidential
supervision of rulemaking if it is not to cause an imbalance in our
constitutional scheme. The courts should have no special difficulty
in reviewing procedural directives on their face. Nor do issues of ex
parte influence pose grave institutional difficulties-the courts have
already placed some limits on ex parte influence in rulemaking.
More serious problems, however, might attend judicial review of the
270. See pp. 464-65 supra.
271. In terms of the source of a contact, it seems practical to treat any communication
originating beyond the rulemaking agency as external for purposes of the record. This
principle should adequately respond to the Vermont Yankee Court's emphasis on the
predictability of judicial review. See 435 U.S. at 546-47. Moreover, it would allow confidentiality for the internal deliberation that precedes adoption of any rule. The importance of this interest was recognized in Nixon, 418 U.S. at 705-07, and has been
recognized in statutory form. The Freedom of Information Act exempts from disclosure
to the public both intra-agency and interagency memoranda, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(5) (West
1977), if they "would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation
with the agency." The Act is not affirmative authority, however, for withholding information. Id. § 552(c).
The approach of the courts has been to rely on congressionally imposed requirements
that rules be fully explained and their factual basis revealed as a way to flush out onto
the record those internal data and arguments having an effect on a final rule. See p. 455
supra. Interagency communications, however, do not stand on the same footing, since they
may come from a source having a policy orientation quite different from that of the
rulemaking agency, and practical power to deflect the rulemaker from his statutory
criteria for decision. Interagency communications will also reflect the substantially lessened familiarity with the rulemaking record of those outside the agency that is compiling it. They are thus "external" influences in a very real sense, and should appear on
the record. But see Pedersen, supra note 7, at 58-59 (differences between internal and
external influences on agency can be overstated). A distinction between intra-agency and
interagency communications would also have the practical advantage of relative clarity.
The APA draws the line at this point for its proscription of ex parte influences on
adjudication. 5 U.S.C. § 557(d) (1976). These considerations seem sufficient to take interagency communications out of the constitutional executive privilege recognized in
Nixon.
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basis for a substantive directive. The courts may be able to engage
in the same process for this purpose as the one that they have developed to review the administrative record and formal explanations
accompanying agency rules: the courts presently review for rationality,
procedural regularity, and conformity to statutory and constitutional
authority.27 2 If the courts treat both presidential and agency explanations as part of the basis of a final rule,2 73 there will be an opportunity
for agency expertise to inform and confine presidential discretion
through the agency contributions to the rulemaking record. The
President will retain the opportunity to resolve ultimate value choices
within the alternatives left open by statute. Moreover, the very requirement that presidential directives be explained sufficiently to survive
normal judicial review of rulemaking should provide a practical check
on the frequency with which Presidents will exercise this power.
Still, there is reason to doubt the efficacy of judicial review of a
presidential statement of necessity in support of a directive. The
courts may have trouble reviewing presidential initiatives in matters
traditionally accorded wide executive discretion.2 7 4 For example, the
courts may not know how to review a presidential directive affecting
the interest rate set by the FRB if the President's explanation includes balance-of-trade concerns. Yet the limited scope of judicial
review should make feasible even review of these kinds of explanations;
the courts are called upon to scrutinize only the rationality, not the
correctness of the executive decision.27 5 The courts may find some
matters covered by presidential directives to be nonreviewable,2 70 but
the courts should feel competent to perform their task on the usual
subjects of economic and social rulemaking.
When judicial review of presidential action is hampered, the capacity of Congress to restrain the President assumes special importance. Presidential directives force Congress to pass legislation if it
272. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976). See generally Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973).
273. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 706 (1976) should provide the statutory wan-ant for such a
process.
274. In Chicago & S. Airlines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948), the

Court held presidential review of CAB foreign route awards to be nonreviewable. The
Court viewed final executive approval of the route as a "political question," and held
that disclosure of grounds for the decision, which is the essence of judicial review, might
reveal secret "intelligence" to which the President was privy. Id.
275. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 68-69 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976)
(statement of Leventhal, J.).
276. See Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of "Committed to Agency
Discretion", 82 HARV. L. REv. 367 (1968); Note, The Supreme Court's Use of Statutory
Interpretation: Morris v. Gressette, APA Nonreviewability, and the Idea of a Legislative
Scheme, 87 YALE L.J. 1636 (1978).
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wants to change presidential policy, and probably to muster the twothirds majority necessary to override a veto.27 7 To some extent, this
situation obtains whenever Congress delegates discretion to executive officers, who often run the risk that legislation will be passed to
override their policy decisions. The special effect of presidential
action would be to shift executive discretion to its most powerful
locus. Nevertheless, the situations that strain the effectiveness of judicial review of presidential action do not necessarily portend a similar
institutional disability for Congress. Even when foreign affairs or
national defense are the basis for a presidential directive, the directive only changes an agency regulation. Although Congress has experienced difficulties in checking such activities as presidential warmaking, there seems no reason to fear congressional inability or unwillingness to join issue with a President over supervision of rulemaking. Held in check by both Congress and the courts, 278 presidential
initiatives in agency regulation can support the constitutional scheme
of mutually limiting powers, while increasing the rationality and
political accountability of agency rulemaking.
277.

See p. 462 supra.

278. Concern that judicial review of presidential action might prove ineffective is
matched by concern that it can prove too effective-by interfering with the implementation of statutory programs. Private parties may seek to enforce a presidential order and
delay agency rulemaking. It may be possible for the President to forbid such review in
whole or in part, although he should not be able to foreclose review of the validity of
the order. There is substantial authority for the President's power to avoid private enforcement of Executive Order No. 12,044 which states an intention to avoid expanding
judicial review of agency action. See Independent Meat Packers Ass'n v. Butz, 529 F.2d
228, 314 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 966 (1976) (denying private civil action to
enforce presidential order because order in question "was intended primarily as a managerial tool for implementing the President's personal economic policies and not as a
legal framework enforceable by private civil action"). If the parties in Meat Packers had
not had standing on a basis independent of their request for review of the agency's
compliance with the order, the court could have dismissed the suit entirely. For the most
part, it seems permissible for the President to foreclose judicial review of agency compliance with the order by those without an independent basis for obtaining review. The
public has an opportunity to participate in the enforcement process by commenting on
agency compliance reports. Where an independent basis for private standing exists, however, the courts should review agency compliance with an order to the extent that the
private party can plausibly claim to have been affected by noncompliance. See Note,
supra note 263.
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